## 1AC

### 1AC Plan

#### The United States federal judiciary should require that the president cannot continue the detention of personnel that have successfully won a habeas corpus hearing.

### 1AC Legitimacy

#### Contention One is Legitimacy

#### The Kiyemba court ruled the right to habeas doesn’t give the power to release a detainee or stop transfer

Milko 12

[Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, “Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance”, 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173]

After the Boumediene and Munaf cases, it was clear that the United States district courts have habeas jurisdiction over detainee cases, and the District of Columbia Circuit has taken center stage in Guantanamo cases. n58 While many felt that Boumediene granted federal judges considerable control over the legal fate of detainees, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used the Supreme Court's warning not to "second-guess" the Executive as its mantra in detainee cases. Though the district court ruled in several cases that a remedy, including actual release, was proper, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has never approved such a release and has struck down district court orders seeking to control the fate of detainees. n59 1.Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III-Petitions for Release into the United States Following the Boumediene decision and after a determination by the Government that they were no longer "enemy combatants," seventeen Uighurs n60 detained at Guantanamo Bay for over seven years petitioned for the opportunity to challenge their detention as unlawful and requested to be released into the United States. n61 [\*182] Because they were no longer classified as "enemy combatants," the issue presented to the district court was "whether the Government had the authority to 'wind up' the petitioners' detention" or if the court could authorize the release of the Uighurs. n62 The district court decided that the Government's authority to "wind-up" the detentions ceased when "(1) detention becomes effectively indefinite; (2) there is a reasonable certainty that the petitioner will not return to the battlefield to fight against the United States; and (3) an alternative legal justification has not been provided for continued detention. Once these elements are met, further detention is unconstitutional." n63 Under this framework, the court decided that the time for wind-up authority had ended, and looked to the remedies the judiciary could utilize under its habeas jurisdiction. n64 The court concluded that based on separation of powers, the courts had authority to protect individual liberty, especially when the Executive Branch brought the person into the court's jurisdiction and then undermined the efforts of release. n65 Noting that the Executive could not have the power to limit the scope of habeas by merely assuring the court that it was using its best efforts to release the detainees, the court held that under the system of checks and balances and the importance of separation of powers to the protection of liberty, the motion for release was granted. n66 In the case renamed Kiyemba v. Obama on appeal, and commonly referred to as Kiyemba I, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, framing the issue as whether the courts had authority to issue release into the United States. n67 Because there was the potential that the Petitioners would be harmed if returned to their native China, the Government asserted that they had been undergoing extensive efforts to relocate the detainees in suitable third countries. n68 The court based its reversal on case law that held that the power to exclude aliens from the country was an inherent Executive power, and not one with which the courts should inter [\*183] fere. n69 Though Petitioners claimed that release was within the court's habeas power, the court of appeals noted that the Petitioners sought more than a "simple release"-they sought to be released into the United States, and habeas could not interfere with the Executive's power to control the borders. n70 The Supreme Court granted the Petitioner's writ of certiorari in which they argued that the courts had the authority to issue release of unlawfully detained prisoners under its habeas power and to hold otherwise constituted a conflict with Boumediene. n71 By the time the case reached the High Court for determination on the merits, all of the detainee-Petitioners received resettlement offers, and only five had rejected these offers. n72 Due to the possibility of a factual difference based on this new information, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. n73 The remanded case became known as Kiyemba III. n74 The court of appeals reinstated its former opinion from Kiyemba I. n75 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that just prior to the Kiyemba I decision, the government filed information under seal which indicated that all seventeen Petitioners had received a resettlement offer, and this influenced the court's conclusion that the Government was engaging in diplomatic efforts to relocate the detainees when it decided Kiyemba I. n76 Even if the Petitioners had a valid reason to decline these offers, it did not change the underlying notion that habeas afforded no remedy to be released into the United States. n77 Additionally, the court determined that the Petitioners had no privilege to have the courts review the determinations made by the Executive regarding the locations of resettlement, as this was a foreign policy issue for the political branches to handle. n78 The five remaining petitioners filed a second petition for certiorari on December 8, 2010, asking the Supreme Court to decide [\*184] whether the courts had the power to release unlawfully detained aliens under its habeas jurisdiction. n79 2.Kiyemba II and Petitions Requesting Notice of Transfer Prior to Release While the Kiyemba I and Kiyemba III litigation was occurring, a separate Uighur petition was moving through the D.C. Circuit. Nine Uighurs petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas, and asked the court to require the government to provide 30 days' advance notice of any transfer from Guantanamo based on fear of torture, and the district court granted the petition. n80 The cases were consolidated on appeal and renamed Kiyemba v. Obama, which is referred to as Kiyemba II. The Kiyemba II case has been the source of much debate over both the proper allocation of power in the tripartite system and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' use of Supreme Court precedent in detainee cases. The D.C. Court of Appeals analogized the Uighurs' claims in the Kiyemba II case to the 2008 Supreme Court decision Munaf v. Geren, which held that habeas corpus did not prevent the transfer of an American citizen in captivity in Iraq to face prosecution in a sovereign state. n81 The court of appeals analyzed the Uughurs' claims by comparing them to the Munaf petitioners. First, the court found that the Uighurs and the petitioners in Munaf sought an order of the district court to enjoin their transfer based on fear of torture in the recipient country. n82 As in Munaf, the court decided that if the United States Government had asserted that it was against its policy to transfer detainees to a location where they may face torture, the Judiciary could not question that determination. n83 In reaching that conclusion, the Kiyemba II court cited to the Munaf language that the Judiciary should not "second-guess" the Executive in matters of foreign policy. n84 [\*185] Just as the court rejected the fear of torture argument, the Petitioners' claims that transfer should be enjoined to prevent continued detention or prosecution in the recipient country was also denied based on Munaf. n85 As Munaf reasoned, detainees could not use habeas as a means to hide from prosecution in a sovereign country, and any judicial investigation into a recipient country's laws and procedures would violate international comity and the Executive Branch's role as the sole voice on foreign policy. n86 Additionally, because the 30 days' notice requirements were seen as an attempt by the courts to enjoin the transfer of a detainee, they, too, were impermissible remedies. n87 Judge Griffith, concurring and dissenting in part, opined that Munaf did not require total deference to the political branches in detainee matters, that privileges of detainees outlined in Boumediene required advance notice of any transfer from Guantanamo, and the opportunity to challenge the Government's determination that transfer to the recipient country would not result in torture or additional detainment. n88 The Judge distinguished Munaf from the present situation because in the former, the petitioners knew they were going to be transferred to Iraqi custody and had an opportunity to bring habeas petitions to challenge that transfer. n89 In closing, Judge Griffith believed that "the constitutional habeas protections extended to these petitioners by Boumediene would be greatly diminished, if not eliminated, without an opportunity to challenge the government's assurances that their transfers will not result in continued detention on behalf of the United States." n90 Following this reversal, the Petitioners filed a motion for rehearing and suggested a rehearing en banc, as well as a stay of the mandate of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. n91 Both of these motions were denied, and the Petitioners filed a writ for a petition of certiorari on November 10, 2009. n92 The Supreme Court denied the writ on March 22, 2010. n93 [\*186]

#### These rulings make habeas useless—this abdicates their key role

Milko 12 [Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, “Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance”, 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173]

A. Arguments for a Remedy By urging deference to the Executive Branch, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has scolded the district courts that have second-guessed the political branches' determinations about release and suitable transfers. Those in favor of judicial power have argued that the denial of the right to review the Executive's decisions is allowing too much deference to that branch and severely limiting the remedies that courts have had the power to issue in the past. Though the petitioners have made several arguments for relief, the main arguments for judicial power stem from the idea that the court of appeals has been improperly applying Supreme Court precedent. Petitioners have argued that the D.C. Court of Appeals expanded the scope of Munaf too broadly as the Supreme Court noted that the decision was limited to the facts of that case. n118 In Munaf, the Court was primarily concerned about allowing the Iraqi government to have the power to punish people who had committed crimes in that territory when fashioning its holding, and the petitioners in that case had the opportunity of notice because they were told about their transfer and were able to petition the court to try and prevent it. n119 Petitioners have argued that those facts are entirely different than cases such as Mohammed and Khadr where there was concern of torture in foreign nations but no need to allow those nations to have the ability to prosecute the detainees for crimes, there was potential for torture at the hands of non-government entities, and no notice of transfer was permitted. n120 [\*190] Additionally, Petitioners have argued that the use of Munaf has impermissibly limited Boumediene by preventing courts from fashioning equitable relief for habeas petitions. n121 There has been concern that the ability to use the writ of habeas will be essentially eliminated if there is no chance for a petitioner to challenge the Executive Branch's determinations regarding safe transfers. The Boumediene Court spent considerable time discussing the history of the writ n122 and noted that the tribunals implemented in that case to determine enemy combatant status were not a sufficient replacement for the writ of habeas because they lacked, in part, the authority to issue an order of release. n123 Here, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has effectively prevented the other courts from determining if there is a right not to be transferred, which has been argued to be an inadequate statement of the right of habeas. n124 Similarly, it has been argued that by accepting the Executive Branch's assurances of its efforts to release the detainees, the courts are not properly using the power of habeas corpus that has been granted to them by the Constitution. n125 By refusing to question these assertions, the courts would be unable to offer a remedy to the petitioners who have the privilege of habeas corpus. n126 The Petitioners also argued a due process right to challenge transfers as the detainees have a right to a meaningful hearing to at least have the opportunity to challenge the Government's conclusions regarding safety. n127 By refusing to second-guess the Executive, the judiciary may be losing an important check on the former's power because there is no guarantee that the Executive is ensuring safety or making the best effort to protect the unlawfully kept detainees. Without allowing courts to have the power to enjoin a transfer in order to examine these concerns, there is the potential that the detainee could be harmed at the hands of foreign terrorists. Without the ability to challenge the Executive Branch through the judicial tool of habeas corpus, there has been genuine concern that the courts are losing too much power and that their authority [\*191] is being improperly limited, as they are not utilizing their constitutional power properly.

#### Kiyemba decisions undermined legitimacy of our commitment to the rule of law globally

Vaughn and Williams, Professors of Law, 13 [2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, “OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11”, Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2148404]

In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the rule of law—touted by the United States throughout the world since the end of World War II— has been “steadily undermined . . . since we began the so-called ‘War on Terror.’”185 “The American legal messenger,” Tashima notes, “has been regarded throughout the world as a trusted figure of goodwill, mainly by virtue of close identification with the message borne”—“that the rule of law is fundamental to a free, open, and pluralistic society,” that the United States represents “a government of laws and not of persons,” where “no one—not even the President—is above the law.”186 But, according to Tashima, the actions that the United States has “taken in the War on Terror, especially [in] our detention policies, have belied our commitment to the rule of law” and caused a “dramatic shift in world opinion,” so that the War on Terror has been greeted internationally with “increasing skepticism and even hostility.”187 Put differently, the United States has shot the messenger—and with it, goes the message, the commitment to the rule of law, and our international credibility.188 The primary assassin in this “assault on the role of law” is the argument “that the President is not bound by law—that he can flout the Constitution, treaties, and statutes of the United States as Commander-in-Chief during times of war.”189 Also wreaking havoc on the rule of law is the notion, described above, that the President’s actions in times of war are unreviewable, that the judiciary has no role to play in checking wartime policies. What is the likely reason for the executive to take such an approach as their legal defense, despite swearing, upon inauguration, to “preserve, protect[,] and defend the Constitution of the United States,”190 and despite constitutional directive that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”?191 Significantly, as Charles Fried and Gregory Fried observe, the oath of office does not mention defending national security.192 Rather, “the President’s duty is explicitly to the law, not [to] some vague goal beyond the law.”193 According to these authors, “the law is our defense against tyranny, the arbitrary imposition of one person’s will over all others, and against anarchy, the ungoverned conduct of many people’s wills.”194 If, as the executive has done since 9/11, “we cut down the laws to lay hold of our enemies,” where are we to “hide when the Devil turns round on us, armed with the power of the state?”195 As the Supreme Court so eloquently noted in Ex Parte Milligan,196 the Constitution “is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”197 Central to this protection are the separation of powers, by which one branch of government is not permitted to go unchecked. Indeed, as Justice O’Connor stated in the Hamdi case, “[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”198 And even the executive’s war power “does not remove constitutional limitations,” including the separation of powers, “safeguarding essential liberties.”199 Perhaps the most likely reason, then, for the position taken by the Bush administration has its roots in an old adage from the Nixon administration. As history will recall, in May 1977, former President Richard M. Nixon famously told British interviewer David Frost that “when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”200 The Bush administration, taking a page out of Nixon’s book, used various tactics to effectively “dismantle constitutional checks and balances and to circumvent the rule of law.”201 In so doing, the administration took advantage of 9/11 to assert “the most staggering view of unlimited presidential power since Nixon’s assertion of imperial prerogatives.”202 The D.C. Circuit’s reinstated opinion in Kiyemba III is, as we have noted, governing. That opinion, adopting a view that the government had argued all along, recharacterizes the law pertaining to detainees at Guantanamo Bay as a matter of immigration—an area of law in which the sovereign prerogative on which is admitted and excluded from entry into the United States is virtually immune from judicial review.203 This is not, as we explain below, a matter of immigration; instead, it is a matter of the executive’s power to imprison and detain, as the Supreme Court stated in Boumediene.204 The Bush administration long adopted the position that judicial review of its detention policies would frustrate its war efforts and its Commander-in-Chief authority. However, as the Boumediene Court explained, “the exercise of [the executive’s Commander-in-Chief powers] is vindicated, not eroded, when [or, if] confirmed” by the judiciary.205 As the Milligan Court stated, the founding fathers “knew—the history of the world told them—the nation they were founding, be its existence short of long, would be involved in war.”206 How frequently or of what length, “human foresight could not tell.”207 But, the founders knew that “unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen.”208 For this reason, “they secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation.”209 These safeguards cannot be disturbed by any one branch, unless the Constitution so provides—and with the checks authorized therein.210 Indeed, “[t]o hold [that] the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not [the courts] say ‘what the law is.’”211 “Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.”212 To the extent that it has been—through executive action, paired with judicial inaction—the rule of law is undermined. We can and we must do better—the Constitution, and those who drafted it, demand so.

#### The aff is key—perception of US provision of habeas rights is critical to US soft power—the vital aspect of US legal jurisprudence—court action is key

Sidhu 11

[2011, Dawinder S. Sidhu, J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, Judicial Review as Soft Power: How the Courts Can Help Us Win the Post-9/11 Conflict”, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF, Vol. 1, Issue 1 http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=nslb]

The “Great Wall” The writ of habeas corpus enables an individual to challenge the factual basis and legality of his detention,91 activating the judiciary’s review function in the separation of powers scheme.92 Because the writ acts to secure individual liberty by way of the judicial checking of unlawful executive detentions, the writ has been regarded as a bulwark of liberty. The Supreme Court has observed, for example, that “There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus . . . .”93 The writ is seen as a vital aspect of American jurisprudence, and an essential element of the law since the time of the Framers.94 The United States is a conspicuous actor in the world theater, subject to the interests and inclinations of other players, and possessing a similar, natural desire to shape the global community in a manner most favorable to its own objects. The tendency to attempt to inﬂuence others is an inevitable symptom of international heterogeneity and, at present, the United States is mired in an epic battle with fundamentalists bent on using terrorism as a means to repel,95 if not destroy, America.96 American success in foreign policy depends on the internal assets available to and usable by the United States, including its soft power. The law in America is an aspect of its national soft power. In particular, the moderates in the Muslim world—the intended audience of America’s soft power— may ﬁnd attractive the American constitutional system of governance in which 1) the people are the sovereign and the government consists of merely temporary and recallable agents of the people, 2) federal power is diffused so as to diminish the possibility that any branch of the government, or any of them acting in tandem, can infringe upon the liberty of the people, 3) structural protections notwithstanding, the people are entitled to certain substantive rights including the right to be free of governmental interference with respect to religious exercise, 4) the diversity of interests inherent in its populace is considered a critical safeguard against the ability of a majority group to oppress the minority constituents, 5) the courts are to ensure that the people’s rights to life, liberty, and property are not abridged, according to law, by the government or others, and 6) individuals deprived of liberty have available to them the writ of habeas corpus to invoke the judiciary’s checking function as to executive detention decisions. The Constitution, in the eyes of Judge Learned Hand, is “the best political document ever made.”97 If the aforementioned constitutional principles are part of the closest approximation to a just and reasoned society produced by man, surely they may have some persuasive appeal to the rest of the world, including moderate Muslims who generally live in areas less respectful of minority rights and religious pluralism. Such reverence is to be expected and warranted only if the United States has remained true to these constitutional principles in practice, and in particular, in its behavior in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when national stress is heightened and the option of deviating from such values in favor of an expedient “law of necessity” similarly tempting.98 The extent to which the United States has remained true to itself as a nation of laws—and thus may credibly claim such legal soft power—is the subject of the next section. II. THE COURTS AND SOFT POWER The Judiciary In Wartime The United States has been charged with being unfaithful to its own laws and values in its prosecution of the post-9/11 campaign against transnational terrorism. With respect to its conduct outside of the United States, following 9/11, America has been alleged to have tortured captured individuals in violation of its domestic and international legal obligations,99 and detained individuals indeﬁnitely without basic legal protections.100 Closer to home, the United States is thought to have proﬁ led Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in airports and other settings,101 conducted immigration sweeps targeting Muslims,102 and engaged in mass preventative detention of Muslims in the United States,103 among other things. These are serious claims. The mere perception that they bear any resemblance to the truth undoubtedly impairs the way in which the United States is viewed by Muslims around the world, including Muslim-Americans, and thus diminishes the United States’ soft power resources.104 The degree to which they are valid degrades the ability of the United States to argue persuasively that it not only touts the rule of law, but exhibits actual ﬁdelity to the law in times of crisis. These claims relate to conduct of the executive and/or the legislature in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This Article is concerned, however, with the judiciary, that is whether the courts have upheld the rule of law in the post-9/11 context—and thus whether the courts may be a source of soft power today (even if the other branches have engaged, or are alleged to have engaged, in conduct that is illegal or unwise). As to the courts, it is my contention that the judiciary has been faithful to the rule of law after 9/11 and as such should be considered a positive instrument of American soft power. Prior to discussing post-9/11 cases supporting this contention, it is important to provide a historical backdrop to relationship between the courts and wartime situations because judicial decision-making in cases implicating the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq does not take occur on a blank slate, despite the unique and modern circumstances of the post-9/11 conﬂ ict.

#### Indefinite detention is the key factor — prefer statistical data

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[March, 2011, David Welsh has a J.D. from the University of Utah. He is currently a doctoral student in the Eller School of Business at the University of Arizona where his research focuses on organizational fairness and ethics, "Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy”, 9 U.N.H. L. Rev. 261]

Today, many individuals throughout the world question whether the United States has engaged in excess in response to the attacks of 9/11. A 2004 poll suggests that many people in France (57%), Germany (49%), and Britain (33%) felt that the United States overreacted in response to terrorism. n30 Among Middle Eastern countries, as many as three-fourths of individuals stated that the United States overreacted in the War on Terror. n31 Additionally, approximately two-thirds of citizens in France, Germany, Turkey, and Pakistan questioned the sincerity of the United States in the War on Terror. n32 Within the United States, nationwide confidence in the White House [\*267] dropped 40% between 2002 and 2004 while confidence in Congress fell by 25% during this period. n33 Although this worldwide drop in legitimacy is the result of multiple factors beyond the scope of this paper, such as the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, detention remains a controversial topic that continues to negatively affect global perceptions of the United States. Although this paper focuses specifically on the detention of suspected terrorists at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp (Guantanamo Bay), n34 this facility is but one of many detention centers holding suspected terrorists on behalf of the United States. n35 Today, approximately 250 prisoners (out of approximately 800) remain at this U.S.-run military base in Cuba that is outside U.S. legal jurisdiction. n36 However, it is critical to note that these 250 individuals represent a mere 1% of "approximately 25,000 detainees worldwide held directly or indirectly by or on behalf of the United States." n37 Prisoners have alleged torture, sexual degradation, religious persecution, n38 and many other specific forms of mistreatment while being detained. n39 In many detention facilities including Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and Bagram, these allegations are substantiated by significant evidence and have gained worldwide attention. n40 [\*268] While some graphic and shocking cases of abuse have been brought to light, n41 a more typical example is the prosecution of sixteen-year-old Mohamed Jawad by Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld at Guantanamo Bay. n42 At first, the case against Jawad looked straightforward, as he had confessed to throwing a grenade that injured two U.S. soldiers and a translator in December 2002. n43 However, a deeper investigation "uncovered a confession obtained through torture, two suicide attempts by the accused, abusive interrogations, the withholding of exculpatory evidence from the defense," and other procedural problems. n44 Vandeveld discovered that the military had obtained confessions from two other individuals for the same offense; he ultimately left his post after attempts to provide "basic fair trial rights" failed. n45 In February 2006, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention spoke out against international law and human rights violations at Guantanamo Bay, stating that the facility should be closed "without further delay." n46 This report paralleled earlier criticism from Amnesty International that Guantanamo Bay violates minimum standards for the treatment of individuals. n47 In response, the United States has argued that detainees are not prisoners of war but are rather "unlawful combatants" who are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention because they do not act in accor [\*269] dance with the accepted rules of war. n48 Yet, regardless of the debatable legal merit of this argument, legitimacy is an "elusive quality" grounded in worldwide opinion that will not let the United States off the hook on a mere technicality when moral duties and international customs have been violated. n49 In the next section, I discuss the importance of legitimacy and the ways in which it has been undermined by U.S. conduct in the War on Terror. By understanding what drives global perceptions of U.S. legitimacy, current detention policies and their ramifications can be more accurately assessed and restructured. IV. Legitimacy: The Critical Missing Element in the War on Terror In the context of the War on Terror, legitimacy is the critical missing element under the current U.S. detention regime. Legitimacy can be defined as "a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and just." n50 As far back as Plato and Aristotle, philosophers have recognized that influencing others merely through coercion and power is costly and inefficient. n51 Today, empirical evidence suggests that legitimacy, rather than deterrence, is primarily what causes individuals to obey the law. n52 Thus, while legal authorities may possess the immediate power to stop illegal action, long-term compliance requires that the general public perceives the law to be legitimate. n53 Terrorism is primarily an ideological war that cannot be won by technology that is more sophisticated or increased military force. n54 While nations combating terrorism must continue to address immediate threats by detaining suspected terrorists, they must also consider the prevention of future threats by analyzing how their policies are perceived by individuals throughout the world. Ultimately, in the War on Terror, "the benefits to be derived from maximizing legitimacy are too important to neglect." n55 Over time, perceptions of legitimacy create a "reservoir of support" for an institution that goes beyond mere self-interest. n56 In the context of government: Legitimacy is an endorphin of the democratic body politic; it is the substance that oils the machinery of democracy, reducing the friction that inevitably arises when people are not able to get everything they want from politics. Legitimacy is loyalty; it is a reservoir of goodwill that allows the institutions of government to go against what people may want at the moment without suffering debilitating consequences. n57 The widespread acceptance of highly controversial decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court illustrates the power of institutional legitimacy. n58 The Court itself noted that it "cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees." n59 "The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy . . . ." n60 For example, by emphasizing "equal treatment," "honesty and neutrality," "gathering information before decision making," and "making principled, or rule based, decisions instead of political decisions," the Court maintained [\*271] legitimacy through the controversial abortion case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992. n61 Thus, although approximately half of Americans oppose abortion, n62 the vast majority of these individuals give deference to the Court's ruling on this issue. n63 In the post-World War II era, the United States built up a worldwide reservoir of support based upon four pillars: "its commitment to international law, its acceptance of consensual decision-making, its reputation for moderation, and its identification with the preservation of peace." n64 Although some U.S. policies between 1950 and 2001 did not align with these pillars, on a whole the United States legitimized itself as a world superpower during this period. n65 In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan spoke of America as a "shining city on a hill," suggesting that it was a model for the nations of the world to look to. n66 While the United States received a virtually unprecedented outpouring of support from the international community following 9/11, a nation's reservoir of support will quickly evaporate when its government overreacts. Across the globe, individuals have expressed a growing dissatisfaction with U.S. conduct in the War on Terror, and by 2006, even western allies of the United States lobbied for the immediate closure of Guantanamo Bay, calling it "an embarrassment." n67 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed that "Guantanamo has become a major, major problem . . . in the way the world perceives America and if it were up to me I would close Guantanamo not tomorrow but this afternoon . . . ." n68 Similarly, [\*272] President Obama noted in his campaign that "Guantanamo has become a recruiting tool for our enemies." n69 Current U.S. detention policies erode each of the four pillars on which the United States established global legitimacy. In fact, critics have argued that the "United States has **assumed** many of the very features of the 'rogue nations' against which it has rhetorically--and sometimes literally--done battle over the years." n70 While legitimacy cannot be regained overnight, the recent election of President Barack Obama presents a critical opportunity for a re-articulation of U.S. detention policies. Although President Obama issued an executive order calling for the closure of Guantanamo Bay only two days after being sworn into office, n71 significant controversy remains about the kind of alternate detention system that will replace it. n72 In contrast to the current model, which has largely rendered inefficient decisions based on ad hoc policies, I argue for the establishment of a domestic terror court (DTC) created specifically to deal with the unique procedural issues created by a growing number of suspected terrorists.

#### Legitimacy is critical to make US leadership durable and effective—judicial action on indefinite detention is crucial

Knowles 9 [Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87]

American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity was thought to be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to protect their own security, form alliances to counter-balance the leading state. n322 But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge America's military predominance. n323 Although some realists predict that [\*140] counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring, n324 William Wohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true counter-balancing, in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen for decades. n325 American unipolarity is unprecedented. n326 First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia. n327 This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another. n328 Second, the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power - military, economic, technological, and in terms of what is known as "soft power." This advantage "is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system." n329 Third, unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo for the first time since the seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern previous experience with balancing. n330 Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war between great powers in today's world is very unlikely. n331 These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United States operated for all of its history until 1991. The lack of balancing means that the United States, and by extension the executive branch, faces much weaker external constraints on its exercise of power than in the past. n332 Therefore, the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any other nations' have in history. n333 And it is these internal processes, as much as external developments, that will determine the durability of American unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the [\*141] stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears legitimate. n334 Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics, with the preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a unipolar order. n335 Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic specialization among nations. n336 For example, if Nation X's security is supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, the preeminent state has "the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests." n337 The hegemon, in return, provides public goods for the system as a whole. n338 The hegemon possesses not only superior command of military and economic resources but "soft" power, the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests. n339 The durability and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate. n340 [\*142] The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the U.S. acts as a world government. n341 It provides public goods for the world, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345 The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest "consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. n346 The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law. n347 Moreover, controlling international norms are [\*143] sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment of enemy combatants." n348 These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349 American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350 The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354 The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an [\*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts. n355 Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core - the preeminent state - ruling the periphery through intermediaries. n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries (the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other. n358 The success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim." n359 Stability in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting differences among potential challengers. n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling "different identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations scholars question the comparison. n362 However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply. n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365 [\*145] But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend to fail when peripheries can communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information ... about its bargains and activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial rule - is also unlikely to be effective today. The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists, through the Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's "brand" and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy. B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on successful functioning of the U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. "World power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure created by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington." n370 These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional competences of the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. [\*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights from a major alternative theory of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of states - in particular, the form of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, democratic states and non-democratic states. n373 Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of deference. n375 One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century, America's global role has changed, and the best means of achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The international realm remains highly political - if not as much as in the past - but it is American politics that matters most. If the U.S. is truly an empire - [\*147] and in some respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of managing relations with one other great power or many great powers. Similarly, the management of hegemony or unipolarity requires a different set of competences. Although American predominance is recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks - unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place. n378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. n379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is unusually stable and durable. n380 As noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. n381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. n382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. n383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. n384 [\*148] Third, the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American hegemony depends not just on power, but legitimacy. n385 All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states - although unipolarity less than hegemony or empire - suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability and durability of the system. Although empires and predominant states in unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. n386 Legitimacy as a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient. The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. The courts' strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy. This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap. And the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional considerations - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - against one another is made less intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.

#### Judicial action clarifying a meaningful right to habeas is key

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The Bush Administration's detainee policy made clear that - due to America's power - the content of enforceable international law applicable to the detainees would largely depend on interpretation by the U.S. government. Under the classic realist paradigm, international law is less susceptible to judicial comprehension because it cannot be taken at face value; its actual, enforceable meaning depends on ever-shifting political dynamics and complex relationships among great powers. But in a hegemonic system, while enforceable international legal norms may still be political, their content is heavily influenced by the politics of one nation - the United States. n412 As an institution of that same government, the courts are well-positioned to understand and interpret international law that has been incorporated into U.S. law. Because the courts have the capacity to track international legal norms, there was no longer a justification for exceptional deference to the Administration's interpretation of the Geneva Conventions as applied to the detainees. Professors Posner and Sunstein have argued for exceptional deference on the ground that, unless the executive is the voice of the nation in foreign affairs, other nations will not know whom to hold accountable for foreign policy decisions. n413 But the Guantanamo litigation demonstrated that American hegemony has altered this classic assumption as well. The [\*154] transparent and accessible nature of the U.S. government made it possible for other nations to be informed about the detainee policy and, conceivably, to have a role in changing it. The Kuwaiti government hired American attorneys to represent their citizens held at Guantanamo. n414 In the enemy combatant litigation, the government was forced to better articulate its detainee policies, justify the detention of each detainee, and permit attorney visits with the detainees. n415 Other nations learned about the treatment of their citizens through the information obtained by attorneys. n416 Although the political climate in the U.S. did not enable other nations to have an effect on detainee policy directly - and Congress, in fact, acted twice to limit detainees' access to the courts n417 - this was an exceptional situation. Foreign governments routinely lobby Congress for favorable foreign affairs legislation, and are more successful with less politically-charged issues. n418 Even "rogue states" such as Myanmar have their lobbyists in Washington. n419 In addition, foreign governments facing unfavorable court decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through political channels. n420 The accessibility and openness of the U.S. government is not a scandal or weakness; instead, it strengthens American hegemony by giving other nations a voice in policy, drawing them into deeper relationships that serve America's strategic interests. n421 In the Guantanamo litigation, the courts served as an important accountability mechanism when the political branches were relatively unaccountable to the interests of other nations. The hegemonic model also reduces the need for executive branch flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts. The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends on the ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance depends on, among other things, predictability. n422 G. John Ikenberry analogizes America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation" seeking foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy making in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and [\*155] accountability." n423 Stable interpretation of the law bolsters the stability of the system because other nations will know that they can rely on those interpretations and that there will be at least some degree of enforcement by the United States. At the same time, the separation of powers serves the global-governance function by reducing the ability of the executive branch to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states." n424 The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and faults, was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and was therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated quickly, by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without consulting Congress and over the objections of even some within the executive branch. n425 Although the Administration invoked the law of armed conflict to justify its detention of enemy combatants, it did not seem to recognize limits imposed by that law. n426 Most significantly, it designed the detention scheme around interrogation rather than incapacitation and excluded the detainees from all legal protections of the Geneva Conventions. n427 It declared all detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy combatants" without establishing a regularized process for making an individual determination for each detainee. n428 And when it established the military commissions, also without consulting Congress, the Administration denied defendants important procedural protections. n429 In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum flexibility to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed, the precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s - a period when the international system was radically unstable, and the United States was one of several great powers vying for advantage. n430 But during that time, the executive branch faced much more exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United States strayed too far from established norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other consequences from [\*156] powerful rivals. Today, there are no such constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are not great powers and are not likely to obey international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American rule-breaking will set a pattern of rule-breaking for the world, leading to instability. n431 America's military predominance enables it to set the rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks its own rules, it loses legitimacy. The Supreme Court's response to the detainee policy enabled the U.S. government as a whole to hew more closely to established procedures and norms, and to regularize the process for departing from them. After Hamdi, n432 the Department of Defense established a process, the CSRTs, for making an individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all detainees at Guantanamo. After the Court recognized habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo, Congress passed the DTA, n433 establishing direct judicial review of CSRT determinations in lieu of habeas. Similarly, after the Court declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan, n434 this forced the Administration to seek congressional approval for commissions that restored some of the rights afforded at courts martial. n435 In Boumediene, the Court rejected the executive branch's foreign policy arguments, and bucked Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review. n436 Throughout this enemy combatant litigation, it has been the courts' relative insulation from politics that has enabled them to take the long view. In contrast, the President's (and Congress's) responsiveness to political concerns in the wake of 9/11 has encouraged them to depart from established norms for the nation's perceived short-term advantage, even at the expense of the nation's long-term interests. n437 As Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal have observed, "treaties are part of [a] system of time-tested standards, and this feature makes the wisdom of their judicial interpretation manifest." n438 At the same time, the enemy combatant cases make allowances for the executive branch's superior speed. The care that the Court took to limit the issues it decided in each case gave the executive branch plenty of time to [\*157] arrive at an effective detainee policy. n439 Hamdi, Rasul, and Boumediene recognized that the availability of habeas would depend on the distance from the battlefield and the length of detention. n440 The enemy combatant litigation also underscores the extent to which the classic realist assumptions about courts' legitimacy in foreign affairs have been turned on their head. In an anarchic world, legitimacy derives largely from brute force. The courts have no armies at their disposal and look weak when they issue decisions that cannot be enforced. n441 But in a hegemonic system, where governance depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts have a greater role to play. Rather than hobbling the exercise of foreign policy, the courts are a key form of "soft power." n442 As Justice Kennedy's majority opinion observed in Boumediene, courts can bestow external legitimacy on the acts of the political branches. n443 Acts having a basis in law are almost universally regarded as more legitimate than merely political acts. Most foreign policy experts believe that the Bush Administration's detention scheme "hurt America's image and standing in the world." n444 The restoration of habeas corpus in Boumediene may help begin to counteract this loss of prestige. Finally, the enemy combatant cases are striking in that they embrace a role for representation-reinforcement in the international realm. n445 Although defenders of special deference acknowledge that courts' strengths lie in protecting the rights of minorities, it has been very difficult for courts to protect these rights in the face of exigencies asserted by the executive branch in foreign affairs matters. This is especially difficult when the minorities are alleged enemy aliens being held outside the sovereign territory of the United States in wartime. In the infamous Korematsu decision, another World War II-era case, the Court bowed to the President's factual assessment of the emergency justifying detention of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry living in the United States. n446 In Boumediene, the Court [\*158] pointedly declined to defer to the executive branch's factual assessments of military necessity. n447 The court may have recognized that a more aggressive role in protecting the rights of non-citizens was required by American hegemony. In fact, the arguments for deference with respect to the rights of non-citizens are even weaker because aliens lack a political constituency in the United States. n448 This outward-looking form of representation-reinforcement serves important functions. It strengthens the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony by establishing equality as a benchmark and reinforces the sense that our constitutional values reflect universal human rights. n449

#### US benevolent hegemony is critical to global peace—the alternative causes massive wars

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A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been less widely appreciated. It nevertheless proved of great significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive cultural influence of the United States.39 This dimension of power base is often neglected. After World War II the authoritarian political cultures of Europe and Japan were utterly discredited, and the liberal democratic elements of those cultures revivified. The revival was most extensive and deliberate in the occupied powers of the Axis, where it was nurtured by drafting democratic constitutions, building democratic institutions, curbing the power of industrial trusts by decartelization and the rebuilding of trade unions, and imprisoning or discrediting much of the wartime leadership. American liberal ideas largely filled the cultural void. The effect was not so dramatic in the "victor" states whose regimes were reaffirmed (Britain, the Low and Scandinavian countries), but even there the United States and its culture was widely admired. The upper classes may often have thought it too "commercial," but in many respects American mass consumption culture was the most pervasive part of America's impact. American styles, tastes, and middle-class consumption patterns were widely imitated, in a process that' has come to bear the label "coca-colonization."40 After WWII policy makers in the USA set about remaking a world to facilitate peace. The hegemonic project involves using political and economic advantages gained in world war to restructure the operation of the world market and interstate system in the hegemon's own image. The interests of the leader are projected on a universal plane: What is good for the hegemon is good for the world. The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project.41 Since wealth depended on peace the U.S set about creating institutions and regimes that promoted free trade, and peaceful conflict resolution. U.S. benevolent hegemony is what has kept the peace since the end of WWII. The upshot is that U.S. hegemony and liberalism have produced the most stable and durable political order that the world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is not as formally or highly integrated as the European Union, but it is just as profound and robust as a political order, Kant’s Perpetual Peace requires that the system be diverse and not monolithic because then tyranny will be the outcome. As long as the system allows for democratic states to press claims and resolve conflicts, the system will perpetuate itself peacefully. A state such as the United States that has achieved international primacy has every reason to attempt to maintain that primacy through peaceful means so as to preclude the need of having to fight a war to maintain it.42 This view of the post-hegemonic Western world does not put a great deal of emphasis on U.S. leadership in the traditional sense. U.S. leadership takes the form of providing the venues and mechanisms for articulating demands and resolving disputes not unlike the character of politics within domestic pluralistic systems.43 America as a big and powerful state has an incentive to organize and manage a political order that is considered legitimate by the other states. It is not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside over a global order that requires constant use of material capabilities to get other states to go along. Legitimacy exists when political order is based on reciprocal consent. It emerges when secondary states buy into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle, and not simply because they are forced into it. But if a hegemonic power wants to encourage the emergence of a legitimate political order, it must articulate principles and norms, and engage in negotiations and compromises that have very little to do with the exercise of power.44 So should this hegemonic power be called leadership, or domination? Well, it would tend toward the latter. Hierarchy has not gone away from this system. Core states have peripheral areas: colonial empires and neo-colonial backyards. Hegemony, in other words, involves a structure in which there is a hegemonic core power. The problem with calling this hegemonic power "leadership" is that leadership is a wonderful thing-everyone needs leadership. But sometimes I have notice that leadership is also an ideology that legitimates domination and exploitation. In fact, this is often the case. But this is a different kind of domination than in earlier systems. Its difference can be seen in a related question: is it progressive? Is it evolutionary in the sense of being better for most people in the system? I think it actually is a little bit better. The trickle down effect is bigger-it is not very big, but it is bigger.45 It is to this theory, Hegemonic Stability that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economic strategies fit the expectations of hegemonic stability theory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. We must first discuss the three pillars that U.S. hegemony rests on structural, institutional, and situational. (1) Structural leadership refers to the underlying distribution of material capabilities that gives some states the ability to direct the overall shape of world political order. Natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size are the characteristics that shape state power, which in turn determine the capacities for leadership and hegemony. If leadership is rooted in the distribution of power, there is reason to worry about the present and future. The relative decline of the United States has not been matched by the rise of another hegemonic leader. At its hegemonic zenith after World War II, the United States commanded roughly forty five percent of world production. It had a remarkable array of natural resource, financial, agricultural, industrial, and technological assets. America in 1945 or 1950 was not just hegemonic because it had a big economy or a huge military; it had an unusually wide range of resources and capabilities. This situation may never occur again. As far as one looks into the next century, it is impossible to see the emergence of a country with a similarly commanding power position. (2) Institutional leadership refers to the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations. It is not power capabilities as such or the interventions of specific states that facilitate concerted action, but the rules and mutual expectations that are established as institutions. Institutions are, in a sense, self-imposed constraints that states create to assure continuity in their relations and to facilitate the realization of mutual interests. A common theme of recent discussions of the management of the world economy is that institutions will need to play a greater role in the future in providing leadership in the absence of American hegemony. Bergsten argues, for example, that "institutions themselves will need to play a much more important role.46 Institutional management is important and can generate results that are internationally greater than the sum of their national parts. The argument is not that international institutions impose outcomes on states, but that institutions shape and constrain how states conceive and pursue their interests and policy goals. They provide channels and mechanisms to reach agreements. They set standards and mutual expectations concerning how states should act. They "bias" politics in internationalist directions just as, presumably, American hegemonic leadership does. (3) Situational leadership refers to the actions and initiatives of states that induce cooperation quite apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions. It is more cleverness or the ability to see specific opportunities to build or reorient international political order, rather than the power capacities of the state, that makes a difference. In this sense, leadership really is expressed in a specific individual-in a president or foreign minister-as he or she sees a new opening, a previously unidentified passage forward, a new way to define state interests, and thereby transforms existing relations. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.47 Especially after the cold war America can be described as trying to keep its position at the top but also integrating others more thoroughly in the international system that it dominates. It is assumed that the differential growth of power in a state system would undermine the status quo and lead to hegemonic war between declining and rising powers48, but I see a different pattern: the U.S. hegemonic stability promoting liberal institutionalism, the events following 9/11 are a brief abnormality from this path, but the general trend will be toward institutional liberalism. Hegemonic states are the crucial components in military alliances that turn back the major threats to mutual sovereignties and hence political domination of the system. Instead of being territorially aggressive and eliminating other states, hegemons respect other's territory. They aspire to be leaders and hence are upholders of inter-stateness and inter-territoriality.49 The nature of the institutions themselves must, however, be examined. They were shaped in the years immediately after World War II by the United States. The American willingness to establish institutions, the World Bank to deal with finance and trade, United Nations to resolve global conflict, NATO to provide security for Western Europe, is explained in terms of the theory of collective goods. It is commonplace in the regimes literature that the United States, in so doing, was providing not only private goods for its own benefit but also (and perhaps especially) collective goods desired by, and for the benefit of, other capitalist states and members of the international system in general. (Particular care is needed here about equating state interest with "national" interest.) Not only was the United States protecting its own territory and commercial enterprises, it was providing military protection for some fifty allies and almost as many neutrals. Not only was it ensuring a liberal, open, near-global economy for its own prosperity, it was providing the basis for the prosperity of all capitalist states and even for some states organized on noncapitalist principles (those willing to abide by the basic rules established to govern international trade and finance). While such behaviour was not exactly selfless or altruistic, certainly the benefits-however distributed by class, state, or region-did accrue to many others, not just to Americans.50 For the truth about U.S. dominant role in the world is known to most clear-eyed international observers. And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population. It is certainly a better international arrangement than all realistic alternatives. To undermine it would cost many others around the world far more than it would cost Americans-and far sooner. As Samuel Huntington wrote five years ago, before he joined the plethora of scholars disturbed by the "arrogance" of American hegemony; "A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country shaping global affairs”. 51 I argue that the overall American-shaped system is still in place. It is this macro political system-a legacy of American power and its liberal polity that remains and serves to foster agreement and consensus. This is precisely what people want when they look for U.S. leadership and hegemony.52 If the U.S. retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it, not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world –and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a New Dark Age. Moreover, the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be ‘apolarity’ –a global vacuum of power.53 Since the end of WWII the United States has been the clear and dominant leader politically, economically and military. But its leadership as been unique; it has not been tyrannical, its leadership and hegemony has focused on relative gains and has forgone absolute gains. The difference lies in the exercise of power. The strength acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was far greater than any single nation had ever possessed, at least since the Roman Empire. America's share of the world economy, the overwhelming superiority of its military capacity-augmented for a time by a monopoly of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them--gave it the choice of pursuing any number of global ambitions. That the American people "might have set the crown of world empire on their brows," as one British statesman put it in 1951, but chose not to, was a decision of singular importance in world history and recognized as such.54 Leadership is really an elegant word for power. To exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they would not otherwise do. It involves the ability to shape, directly or indirectly, the interests or actions of others. Leadership may involve the ability to not just "twist arms" but also to get other states to conceive of their interests and policy goals in new ways. This suggests a second element of leadership, which involves not just the marshalling of power capabilities and material resources. It also involves the ability to project a set of political ideas or principles about the proper or effective ordering of po1itics. It suggests the ability to produce concerted or collaborative actions by several states or other actors. Leadership is the use of power to orchestrate the actions of a group toward a collective end.55 By validating regimes and norms of international behaviour the U.S. has given incentives for actors, small and large, in the international arena to behave peacefully. The uni-polar U.S. dominated order has led to a stable international system. Woodrow Wilson’s zoo of managed relations among states as supposed to his jungle method of constant conflict. The U.S. through various international treaties and organizations as become a quasi world government; It resolves the problem of provision by imposing itself as a centralized authority able to extract the equivalent of taxes. The focus of the theory thus shifts from the ability to provide a public good to the ability to coerce other states. A benign hegemon in this sense coercion should be understood as benign and not tyrannical. If significant continuity in the ability of the United States to get what it wants is accepted, then it must be explained. The explanation starts with our noting that the institutions for political and economic cooperation have themselves been maintained. Keohane rightly stresses the role of institutions as "arrangements permitting communication and therefore facilitating the exchange of information. By providing reliable information and reducing the costs of transactions, institutions can permit cooperation to continue even after a hegemon's influence has eroded. Institutions provide opportunities for commitment and for observing whether others keep their commitments. Such opportunities are virtually essential to cooperation in non-zero-sum situations, as gaming experiments demonstrate. Declining hegemony and stagnant (but not decaying) institutions may therefore be consistent with a stable provision of desired outcomes, although the ability to promote new levels of cooperation to deal with new problems (e.g., energy supplies, environmental protection) is more problematic. Institutions nevertheless provide a part of the necessary explanation.56 In restructuring the world after WWII it was America that was the prime motivator in creating and supporting the various international organizations in the economic and conflict resolution field. An example of this is NATO’s making Western Europe secure for the unification of Europe. It was through NATO institutionalism that the countries in Europe where able to start the unification process. The U.S. working through NATO provided the security and impetus for a conflict prone region to unite and benefit from greater cooperation. Since the United States emerged as a great power, the identification of the interests of others with its own has been the most striking quality of American foreign and defence policy. Americans seem to have internalized and made second nature a conviction held only since World War II: Namely, that their own wellbeing depends fundamentally on the well-being of others; that American prosperity cannot occur in the absence of global prosperity; that American freedom depends on the survival and spread of freedom elsewhere; that aggression anywhere threatens the danger of aggression everywhere; and that American national security is impossible without a broad measure of international security. 57 I see a multi-polar world as one being filled with instability and higher chances of great power conflict. The Great Power jostling and British hegemonic decline that led to WWI is an example of how multi polar systems are prone to great power wars. I further posit that U.S. hegemony is significantly different from the past British hegemony because of its reliance on consent and its mutilaterist nature. The most significant would be the UN and its various branches financial, developmental, and conflict resolution. It is common for the international system to go through cataclysmic changes with the fall of a great power. I feel that American hegemony is so different especially with its reliance on liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence that U.S. hegemonic order and governance will be maintained by others, if states vary in size, then cooperation between the largest of the former free riders (and including the declining hegemonic power) may suffice to preserve the cooperative outcome. Thus we need to amend the assumption that collective action is impossible and incorporate it into a fuller specification of the circumstances under which international cooperation can be preserved even as a hegemonic power declines.58 If hegemony means the ability to foster cooperation and commonalty of social purpose among states, U.S. leadership and its institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its post war position of military and economic dominance; and it will outlast the foreign policy stumbling of particular administrations.59 U.S. hegemony will continue providing the public good that the world is associated with despite the rise of other powers in the system “cooperation may persist after hegemonic decline because of the inertia of existing regimes. Institutional factors and different logics of regime creation and maintenance have been invoked to explain the failure of the current economic regime to disintegrate rapidly in response to the decline of American predominance in world affairs.”60 Since the end of WWII the majority of the states that are represented in the core have come to depend on the security that U.S. hegemony has provided, so although they have their own national interest, they forgo short term gains to maintain U.S. hegemony. Why would other states forgo a leadership role to a foreign hegemon because it is in their interests; one particularly ambitious application is Gilpin's analysis of war and hegemonic stability. He argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system. Much of Gilpin's argument resembles his own and Krasner's earlier thesis that hegemonic states provide an international order that furthers their own self-interest. Gilpin now elaborates the thesis with the claim that international order is a public good, benefiting subordinate states. This is, of course, the essence of the theory of hegemonic stability. But Gilpin adds a novel twist: the dominant power not only provides the good, it is capable of extracting contributions toward the good from subordinate states. In effect, the hegemonic power constitutes a quasigovernment by providing public goods and taxing other states to pay for them. Subordinate states will be reluctant to be taxed but, because of the hegemonic state's preponderant power, will succumb. Indeed, if they receive net benefits (i.e., a surplus of public good benefits over the contribution extracted from them), they may recognize hegemonic leadership as legitimate and so reinforce its performance and position. During the 19th century several countries benefited from British hegemony particularly its rule of the seas, since WWII the U.S. has also provided a similar stability and security that as made smaller powers thrive in the international system. The model presumes that the (military) dominance of the hegemonic state, which gives it the capacity to enforce an international order, also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to lower the costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of the system.

#### Robust empirical and statistical data proves — hegemony stops extinction

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It is worth first examining the larger picture: **We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its** relative and absolute **lack of mass violence**. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because **if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in** the same sort of **system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order** since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy**, the **persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly **10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. **¶ As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars.** That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude**, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity,** something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. **But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶** To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, **the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.**

### 1AC Democracy

#### Contention two is Democracy:

#### Kiyemba created a model of runaway executive power undermining the global rule of law

Vaughn and Wiliams, Professors of Law, 13 [2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, “OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11”, Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2148404]

When it denied certiorari in Kiyemba III, the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to reassert its primary role under the separation of powers doctrine. In so doing, it allowed the D.C. Circuit’s reinstated, and misguided, decision to stand—allowing the Executive’s sovereign prerogative to trump constitutional mandates. After being reversed three times in a row—in Rasul, Hamdan, and then Boumediene—the D.C. Circuit finally managed in Kiyemba to reassert its highly deferential stance towards the Executive in cases involving national security. Of critical significance is the fact that the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Kiyemba relied on its own view of separation of powers principles—a view that is dramatically different than the view espoused in Boumediene.272 In particular, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an order mandating the Uighurs’ release into the continental United States would impermissibly interfer with the political branches’ exclusive authority over immigration matters. But, this reasoning is legal ground that the Supreme Court has already impliedly—and another three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit more explicitly—covered earlier.273 Denying a practical remedy for unlawfully detained individuals at Guantanamo Bay, in the face of Supreme Court precedent providing such individuals an opportunity to challenge their detention, effectively eviscerates the landmark decision rendered in Boumediene. Thus, the Bush administration’s strategy in employing the “war” paradigm at all costs and without any judicial intervention, while unsuccessful in the Supreme Court, has paid off—in troubling, and binding, fashion—in the D.C. Court of Appeals, where, national security fundamentalism reigns supreme and the Executive’s powers as “Commander-in-Chief” are with little, if any, real check. The consequences of this decision continue today with passage of the NDAA of 2012,274 which President Obama signed into law with reservations on December 31, 2011.275 What is different about this particular defense authorization bill is that it contains detainee provisions that civil liberties groups and human rights advocates have strongly opposed.276 The bill’s supporters strenuously objected to the assertion that these provisions authorize the indefinite detention of U.S. citizens.277 In signing the bill President Obama later issued a statement to the effect that although he had reservations about some of the provisions, he “vowed to use discretion when applying” them.278 Of course, that doesn’t necessarily mean that another administration wouldn’t do otherwise. As a result of these events, what we now have is a fascinating dichotomy with regard to the privilege of habeas corpus: A detainee may challenge the legality of their detention through the mechanism of a petition for habeas corpus. But, a habeas court may not order that individual’s release, even in the face of indefinite detention, if the Executive argues otherwise. Thus, as we explain below, what is needed, in our view, is a dissenting voice, reminding us of what is at stake and what is in peril as the Executive’s counterterrorism efforts persist.279 But first, we confront the problem that placed us here: judicial abstention, caused largely by political and practical external influences on the court that have pushed us away from the all-essential separation of powers. 1. Separation of Powers: A Necessary Check on Executive Excess As noted above, the doctrine of separation of powers is a constitutional imperative. As Neal Katyal has noted, “[t]he standard conception of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers.”280 Today, however, “legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi.”281 Indeed, during the Bush Administration’s reign against terror, Congress either failed to act and/or did the Administration’s bidding—providing almost a blank check for any actions the Executive wished to undertake. In such a situation, it is all the more important that the Court act to preserve our tripartite system of government, particularly because national security is an area vulnerable to abuse and excess. The Supreme Court was on board with refusing to endorse a blank check for four years running. But, the Court dropped the ball when it dismissed—at the Executive’s urging—the certiorari petitions in Kiyemba I and III. As stated in the Uighurs’ certiorari petition, as a constitutional matter, “the President’s discretionary release of a prisoner is no different from his discretionary imprisonment: each proceeds from unchecked power.”282 To view the question of release as based on sovereign prerogative in the administration of immigration law, while viewing the question of imprisonment as based on constitutional authority is, put simply, senseless and without precedent. It cannot be that the two inquiries are unrelated; they both undoubtedly implicate individual constitutional rights and the separation of powers.

#### Democratic transitions are coming now — Supreme Court influence is the determining factor

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The Court is certainly the best institution to explain to scholars, governments, lawyers and lay people alike the enduring legal values of the US, why they have been chosen and how they contribute to the development of a stable and democratic society. A return to the mentality that one of America's most important exports is its legal traditions would certainly benefit the US and stands to benefit nations building and developing their own legal traditions, and our relations with them. Furthermore, it stands to increase the influence and higher the profile of the bench. The Court already engages in the exercise of dispensing justice and interpreting the Constitution, and to deliver its opinions with an eye toward their diplomatic value would take only minimal effort and has the potential for high returns. While the Court is indeed the best body to conduct legal diplomacy, it has been falling short in doing so in recent sessions. We are at a critical moment in world history. People in the Middle East and North Africa are asserting discontent with their governments. Many nations in Africa, Asia, and Eurasia are grappling with new technologies, repressive regimes and economic despair. With the development of new countries, such as South Sudan, the formation of new governments, as is occurring in Egypt, and the development of new constitutions, as is occurring in Nepal, it is important that the US welcome and engage in legal diplomacy and informative two-way dialogue. As a nation with lasting and sustainable legal values and traditions, the Supreme Court should be at the forefront of public legal diplomacy. With each decision, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to better define, explain and defend key legal concepts. This is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

#### Promoting a strong judiciary is necessary to make those transitions stable and democratic—detention policies guarantee global authoritarianism

CJA 3, Center for Justice and Accountability

[OCTOBER 2003, The Center for Justice & Accountability (“CJA”) seeks, by use of the legal systems, to deter torture and other human rights abuses around the world., “BRIEF OF the CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, the INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, and INDIVIDUAL ADVOCATES for the INDEPENDENCE of the JUDICIARY in EMERGING DEMOCRACIES as AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS”, http://www.cja.org/downloads/Al-Odah\_Odah\_v\_US\_\_\_Rasul\_v\_Bush\_CJA\_Amicus\_SCOTUS.pdf]

A STRONG, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES AROUND THE WORLD. A. Individual Nations Have Accepted and Are Seeking to Implement Judicial Review By A Strong, Independent Judiciary. Many of the newly independent governments that have proliferated over the past five decades have adopted these ideals. They have emerged from a variety of less-than-free contexts, including the end of European colonial rule in the 1950's and 1960's, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980's and 1990's, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the continuing turmoil in parts of Africa, Latin America and southern Asia. Some countries have successfully transitioned to stable and democratic forms of government that protect individual freedoms and human rights by means of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. Others have suffered the rise of tyrannical and oppressive rulers who consolidated their hold on power in part by diminishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary. And still others hang in the balance, struggling against the onslaught of tyrants to establish stable, democratic governments. In their attempts to shed their tyrannical pasts and to ensure the protection of individual rights, emerging democracies have consistently looked to the United States and its Constitution in fashioning frameworks that safeguard the independence of their judiciaries. See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 91, 92 (2000) (stating that of the “[m]any countries . . . [that] have engaged in fundamental constitutional reform over the past three decades,” nearly all adopted “a bill of rights and establishe[d] some form of active judicial review”) Establishing judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary is a critical step in stabilizing and protecting these new democracies. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing the judicial branch as having "a uniquely important role" in transitional countries, not only to "mediate conflicts between political actors but also [to] prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power; see also Daniel C. Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (1998) ("There is increasing acknowledgment that an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free society . . . . Most countries in transition from dictatorships and/or statist economies recognize the need to create a more stable system of governance, based on the rule of law."), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw. pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). Although the precise form of government differs among countries, “they ultimately constitute variations within, not from, the American model of constitutionalism . . . [a] specific set of fundamental rights and liberties has the status of supreme law, is entrenched against amendment or repeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . .” Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 718 (2001). This phenomenon became most notable worldwide after World War II when certain countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, embraced independent judiciaries following their bitter experiences under totalitarian regimes. See id. at 714- 15; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which — though different from ours in many particulars — unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and practice. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).”). It is a trend that continues to this day. It bears mention that the United States has consistently affirmed and encouraged the establishment of independent judiciaries in emerging democracies. In September 2000, President Clinton observed that "[w]ithout the rule of law, elections simply offer a choice of dictators. . . . America's experience should be put to use to advance the rule of law, where democracy's roots are looking for room and strength to grow." Remarks at Georgetown University Law School, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2218 (September 26, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-26- remarks-by-president-at-georgetown-international-lawcenter.html. The United States acts on these principles in part through the assistance it provides to developing nations. For example, the United States requires that any country seeking assistance through the Millenium Challenge Account, a development assistance program instituted in 2002, must demonstrate, among other criteria, an "adherence to the rule of law." The White House noted that the rule of law is one of the "essential conditions for successful development" of these countries. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).12 A few examples illustrate the influence of the United States model. On November 28, 1998, Albania adopted a new constitution, representing the culmination of eight years of democratic reform after the communist rule collapsed. In addition to protecting fundamental individual rights, the Albanian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary consisting of a Constitutional Court with final authority to determine the constitutional rights of individuals. Albanian Constitution, Article 125, Item 1 and Article 128; see also Darian Pavli, "A Brief 'Constitutional History' of Albania" available at http://www.ipls.org/services/others/chist.html (last visited Janaury 8, 2004); Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Stefaan Van der Jeught, Human Rights Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 475 (Mar. 1998). In South Africa, the new constitutional judiciary plays a similarly important role, following generations of an oppressive apartheid regime. South Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Explanatory Memorandum. It establishes a Constitutional Court which “makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional.” Id. at Chapter 8, Section 167, Item (5), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html?r ebookmark=1 (last visited January 8, 2004); see also Justice Tholakele H. Madala, Rule Under Apartheid and the Fledgling Democracy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Role of the Judiciary, 26 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 743 (Summer 2001). Afghanistan is perhaps the most recent example of a country struggling to develop a more democratic form of government. Adoption by the Loya Jirga of Afghanistan's new constitution on January 4, 2004 has been hailed as a milestone. See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/02/world/main59111 6.shtml (Jan 7, 2004). The proposed constitution creates a judiciary that, at least on paper, is "an independent organ of the state," with a Supreme Court empowered to review the constitutionality of laws at the request of the Government and/or the Courts. Afghan Const. Art. 116, 121 (unofficial English translation), available at http://www.hazara.net/jirga/AfghanConstitution-Final.pdf (last visited January 8, 2004). See also Ron Synowitz, Afghanistan: Constitutional Commission Chairman Presents Karzai with Long-Delayed Draft Constitution (November 3, 2003), available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/11/03112003164239.as p (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). B. Other Nations Have Curtailed Judicial Review During Times Of Crisis, Often Citing the United States' Example, And Individual Freedoms Have Diminished As A Result. While much of the world is moving to adopt the institutions necessary to secure individual rights, many still regularly abuse these rights. One of the hallmarks of tyranny is the lack of a strong and independent judiciary. Not surprisingly, where countries make the sad transition to tyranny, one of the first victims is the judiciary. Many of the rulers that go down that road justify their actions on the basis of national security and the fight against terrorism, and, disturbingly, many claim to be modeling their actions on the United States. Again, a few examples illustrate this trend. In Peru, one of former President Alberto Fujimori’s first acts in seizing control was to assume direct executive control of the judiciary, claiming that it was justified by the threat of domestic terrorism. He then imprisoned thousands, refusing the right of the judiciary to intervene. International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2000-Peru, August 13, 2001, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id\_article=2587&lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe’s rise to dictatorship has been punctuated by threats of violence to and the co-opting of the judiciary. He now enjoys virtually total control over Zimbabweans' individual rights and the entire political system. R.W. Johnson, Mugabe’s Agents in Plot to Kill Opposition Chief, Sunday Times (London), June 10, 2001; International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2002— Zimbabwe, August 27, 2002, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id\_article=2695&lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). While Peru and Zimbabwe represent an extreme, the independence of the judiciary is under assault in less brazen ways in a variety of countries today. A highly troubling aspect of this trend is the fact that in many of these instances those perpetuating the assaults on the judiciary have pointed to the United States’ model to justify their actions. Indeed, many have specifically referenced the United States’ actions in detaining persons in Guantánamo Bay. For example, Rais Yatim, Malaysia's "de facto law minister" explicitly relied on the detentions at Guantánamo to justify Malaysia's detention of more than 70 suspected Islamic militants for over two years. Rais stated that Malyasia's detentions were "just like the process in Guantánamo," adding, "I put the equation with Guantánamo just to make it graphic to you that this is not simply a Malaysian style of doing things." Sean Yoong, "Malaysia Slams Criticism of Security Law Allowing Detention Without Trial," Associated Press, September 9, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 9/9/03 APWIRES 09:34:00). Similarly, when responding to a United States Government human rights report that listed rights violations in Namibia, Namibia's Information Permanent Secretary Mocks Shivute cited the Guantánamo Bay detentions, claiming that "the US government was the worst human rights violator in the world." BBC Monitoring, March 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15938703. Nor is this disturbing trend limited to these specific examples. At a recent conference held at the Carter Center in Atlanta, President Carter, specifically citing the Guantánamo Bay detentions, noted that the erosion of civil liberties in the United States has "given a blank check to nations who are inclined to violate human rights already." Doug Gross, "Carter: U.S. human rights missteps embolden foreign dictators," Associated Press Newswires, November 12, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 11/12/03 APWIRES 00:30:26). At the same conference, Professor Saad Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo (who was jailed for seven years after exposing fraud in the Egyptian election process) said, "Every dictator in the world is using what the United States has done under the Patriot Act . . . to justify their past violations of human rights and to declare a license to continue to violate human rights." Id. Likewise, Shehu Sani, president of the Kaduna, Nigeriabased Civil Rights Congress, wrote in the International Herald Tribune on September 15, 2003 that "[t]he insistence by the Bush administration on keeping Taliban and Al Quaeda captives in indefinite detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, instead of in jails in the United States — and the White House's preference for military tribunals over regular courts — helps create a free license for tyranny in Africa. It helps justify Egypt's move to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security, and does the same for similar measures by the governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso." Available at http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=109927&owner=(IHT)&dat e=20030121123259. In our uni-polar world, the United States obviously sets an important example on these issues. As reflected in the foundational documents of the United Nations and many other such agreements, the international community has consistently affirmed the value of an independent judiciary to the defense of universally recognized human rights. In the crucible of actual practice within nations, many have looked to the United States model when developing independent judiciaries with the ability to check executive power in the defense of individual rights. Yet others have justified abuses by reference to the conduct of the United States. Far more influential than the words of Montesquieu and Madison are the actions of the United States. This case starkly presents the question of which model this Court will set for the world. CONCLUSION Much of the world models itself after this country’s two hundred year old traditions — and still more on its day to day implementation and expression of those traditions. To say that a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case will have global implications is not mere rhetoric. Resting on this Court’s decision is not only the necessary role this Court has historically played in this country. Also at stake are the freedoms that many in emerging democracies around the globe seek to ensure for their peoples.

#### The plan is key — indefinite detention emboldens global destruction of rights protection

**Chaffee 9, Advocacy Counsel at Human Rights First**, Dismantling Guantanamo: Facing the Challenges of Continued Detention and Repatriation: The Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued "Prolonged" Detention Is No Solution To Guantanamo, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?>

The Guantanamo detentions have shown that assessments of dangerousness based not on overt acts, as in a criminal trial, but on association are unreliable and will inevitably lead to costly mistakes. This is precisely why national security preventive detention schemes have proven a dismal failure in other countries. The potential **gains** from such schemes **are** simply **not great enough to warrant departure from hundreds of years of western criminal justice traditions**. [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.195976206604&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18200871754&parent=docview&rand=1379720049684&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n15) The military leaders recognize the disagreeable company that the U.S. keeps when engaging in indefinite detention without trial. U.S. allies in Europe have implemented no comparable long term detention scheme in armed conflict or administrative preventive detention outside of the deportation context. [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.195976206604&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18200871754&parent=docview&rand=1379720049684&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n16) The **governments of countries in Egypt, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya** have **authorized indefinite or successive detention schemes in the name of fighting threats from terrorists or insurgents and all those schemes have resulted in violations of fundamental due process norms.****[n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.195976206604&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18200871754&parent=docview&rand=1379720049684&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n17) In response to this criticism, such governments have cited Guantanamo Bay detention policies to justify repressive schemes of prolonged****[\*191]  detention** without trial-schemes that the U.S. criticizes as authorized arbitrary detention. [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.195976206604&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18200871754&parent=docview&rand=1379720049684&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n18)

**Indefinite detention regimes aimed at preventing security risks are known to foster human rights abuses and to create perverse incentives against bringing criminal charges against prisoners**. That is why the U.S. has been consistently critical of governments that detain indefinitely without charge, including regimes that involve successive review or unrestrained renewable time limits. [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.195976206604&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T18200871754&parent=docview&rand=1379720049684&reloadEntirePage=true" \l "n19) **If** the **Obama** administration **continues to pursue a detention regime for former Guantanamo detainees that permits indefinite detention without charge, it will impact detention policies of governments throughout the world and will likely embolden other governments to circumvent the protections guaranteed in criminal trials by citing security concerns**.

#### Democratic backsliding causes great power war and authoritarianism

Gat 11, Professor at Tel Aviv University, Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, Azar 2011, “The Changing Character of War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32

Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have concentrated the minds of all concerned wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always sufﬁciently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a ‘zone of peace’. War now seems to be conﬁned to the less-developed parts of the globe, the world’s ‘zone of war’, where countries that have so far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries.¶ While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near disappearance of armed conﬂict within the developed world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a ﬂeeting one. The probability of major wars within the developed world remains low—because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy; and that in an afﬂuent and democratic world, major conﬂict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for. This notion, however, is fast eroding with the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent from the international system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents the greatest change in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character.¶ Authoritarian capitalism may be more viable than people tend to assume. 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies, because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efﬁcient economically as, and if anything more successful militarily than, their democratic counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the largest player in the international system in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth that within a generation or two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower.¶ Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers does not necessarily imply open conﬂict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony since the Soviet Union’s collapse could be short-lived and that a universal ‘democratic peace’ may still be far off. The new capitalist authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus, it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conﬂict during the ﬁrst part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes.¶ With the possible exception of the sore Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially conﬁned Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be more problematic. However, as China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, ﬂex its muscles, and behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may coexist more or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called ‘security dilemma’, and against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated ideological rivalry, potential and actual conﬂict, intensiﬁed arms races, and even new cold wars, with spheres of inﬂuence and opposing coalitions. Although great power relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conﬂicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

#### No circumvention

Landau 9, associate professor at Fordham Law

(Joseph, Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. MUSCULAR PROCEDURE: CONDITIONAL DEFERENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE DETENTION CASES Washington Law Review Vol. 84:661, 2009)

The executive detention cases of the past several years have prompted renewed debate over the proper scope of judicial deference to the executive branch’s claimed need to limit individual liberties during times of crisis. Some theorists argue that courts should resolve large policy questions raised by individual challenges to assertions of executive power.1 Others believe that courts should decide as little as possible, asking only whether executive action is grounded within statutory authority.2 However, a number of the post-9/11 national security decisions have accomplished a great deal without following either approach. In these cases, the Supreme Court and a number of lower courts have put procedural devices to surprisingly “muscular” uses. The decisions illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural law where the political branches fail to legislate or properly implement substantive law. This is “muscular procedure”—the invocation of a procedural rule to condition deference on coordinate branch integrity. The cases provide a framework for understanding the role of judicial review in the post-9/11 executive detention decisions, with implications for other fields of law as well.3 Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s executive detention decisions as “merely” procedural rulings, pointing out that the Court has generally addressed itself to questions about adjective law or the ground rules of litigation: whether the Court has jurisdiction; whether detainees can access the courts; and whether the government is required to provide discovery, and if so, how much.4 Far fewer decisions have resolved substantive questions such as the scope of executive power and the content of individual liberty—that is, whom the Executive can hold and for how long, and the specific constitutional protections that apply. But regardless of whether a particular decision turns on “process” or “substance”—an age-old distinction that resists clear definition5—courts have affected the law of national security in profound ways by explicitly requiring the political branches to adhere to a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. In individual cases, rulings about seemingly mundane procedural issues such as discovery and evidentiary standards have accelerated the release of enemy combatant detainees who were held at Guantánamo Bay years after being cleared of any wrongdoing.6 More broadly, procedural devices have been used to smoke out and put in check Congress’s lack of oversight of the executive branch and its misguided interpretations and implementation of authorizing legislation.7 In a number of these cases, courts have resolved the merits of an enemy combatant8 challenge by scrutinizing the Executive’s adherence \ to baseline procedural safeguards—rejecting determinations based on absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay, while affirming executive branch decisions satisfying minimal standards of reliability.9 In the process, the judiciary has rebuffed the President’s extreme interpretations of vague authorizing legislation,10 reexamined inadequately reasoned decisions by various arms of the executive branch in implementing a congressional delegation,11 and stimulated legislative action where Congress has failed to oversee executive decision-making through the legislative process.12 Throughout these decisions, procedure functions as a corrective to decision-making by one (or both) of the political branches that, if left undisturbed, would violate a judicially imposed standard requiring lucid, intelligible procedures.

## 2AC

### Case

#### The proper response to recurrent state/legal racism is protective measures – only legal reform can embed bulwarks against historical injustice

Delgado 98

(Richard, Jean N. Lindsley Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School, “Is American Law Inherently Racist”, Debate w/ Prof. Farber, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1211&context=facpubs)

AUDIENCE: If we accept the premise that American law is inherently racist, what can be done about it? Where do we start? And related to that, how can an inherently racist law be made unracist, or are we just doomed to a perpetual battle to decrease the level of racism in our laws? PROFESSOR DELGADO: No. I don't think that it is a dispiriting or an overly pessimistic view, if one accepts the position-as I do, that American law is recurrently, inherently racist any more than, it is enervating to accept the proposition that the human body, let's say, is inherently frail. From which it follows then that one ought to take reasonable measures. One ought to wear safety belts, one ought to vaccinate children, and one does not simply give up from the recognition that something is inherently a difficulty or a problem. Vigilance is what is called for, not giving up. So no, I do not take the position that the inherent racism that seems to inflict our society requires any sort of surrender. Quite the contrary, it requires all of our efforts if we are to be the society that we can be and that we are in other respects. I will address this point later in my talk.

### AT Reformism Bad

#### Forcing specific policy analysis is key – allows state institutions to be reclaimed and generates debater education necessary to create a left governmentality – necessary to create a public sphere

Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11

(The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

### 2AC Framework

**The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option**

**It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense against**

**The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis**

#### And, debating about the aff is key to solve it—we must keep Guantanamo in the public consciousness in order to organize effective strategies

Cole 12, Professor of Law

[2012, David Cole is a Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “Legal Affairs: Dreyfus, Guantanamo, and the Foundation of the Rule of Law, 29 Touro L. Rev. 43]

Moreover, while district courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction initially ruled in favor of the detainees in the large majority of cases they heard, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has consistently sided with the government on its appeals, and has eased the government's burden to demonstrate that a detainee is lawfully held. n69 The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari from these D.C. Circuit decisions. n70 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's other post-9/11 national security decisions have all been decided in the government's favor. n71 [\*54] The Court rejected two lawsuits seeking damages against Attorney General John Ashcroft for alleged unconstitutional detentions in the roundups that occurred in the wake of 9/11. n72 And the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the criminalization of pure speech advocating peace and human rights under the "material support" statute. n73 The Court's record on protecting human rights, in short, while better than in previous crises, is mixed. Moreover, most of the Bush administration's curtailments of its aggressive initiatives enumerated above were not ordered by a court. No court ordered the abandonment of the first torture memo, an end to extraordinary rendition, the suspension of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, the release of the secret torture memos, or the closure of the CIA's black sites. n74 Approximately 600 men have been released from Guantanamo, but the vast majority was released without a court order, and none have been released under a non-appealable court order. While several district courts have ordered the release of Guantanamo detainees, every time the administration has appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit"), it has prevailed. n75 No court ordered the administration to abandon the Article II Commander-in-Chief theory of uncheckable executive power. Additionally, as noted above, when the D.C. Circuit ruled that international law did not play any role in constraining the president's detention authority, President Obama in effect objected that the court had granted him too much unchecked authority, and insisted that his actions were bound by international law. What, then, caused the United States, specifically the executive branch, to change course? In my view, they were much the same sorts of forces that worked to vindicate Alfred Dreyfus: not the formal separation of powers, but informal nongovernmental resistance in the name of upholding the rule of law. As in the Dreyfus affair, this resistance took the form of individuals, acting on their own and [\*55] in association with others, speaking out, issuing critical reports, organizing protests, filing lawsuits, and generally challenging perceived abuses of power. n76 As in the Dreyfus affair, the media played a critical role, by disclosing secret rights abuses and writing countless editorials espousing the importance of adhering to the rule of law and the Constitution. Were it not for leaks reported in the media, we would not know about the torture at Abu Ghraib, the torture memo, the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, secret CIA prisons, and extraordinary renditions to torture. In addition, international voices played a major role. Guantanamo, after all, held nationals from forty-two countries, and some of those countries objected strongly to the way their countrymen were treated there. A former United Kingdom Law Lord, Lord Steyn, dubbed Guantanamo a "legal black hole," and 175 members of the Houses of Parliament filed an amicus brief on the Guantanamo detainees' behalf in the Supreme Court. n77 Together, these informal forces are responsible, as much as the formal separation of powers, for reining in the United States' "war on terror" in important ways. What lessons, then, can we draw from the Dreyfus affair and the first post-9/11 decade? The first is that the rule of law and individual rights are all too vulnerable to fear and demagoguery in times of crisis. Designed to constrain short-sighted decision making by insisting on adherence to basic principles of fairness, constitutional rights often seem inconvenient obstacles in a crisis. For Dreyfus and many Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, the law was initially unable to offer much, if any, protection. But both affairs also suggest that the rule of law is more resilient than many cynics might think. Alfred Dreyfus was eventually exonerated. The rule of law recovered in significant measure from its hasty dismissal in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, in both instances, the tide turned only because individuals, associations, and nongovernmental organizations [\*56] mobilized behind the cause of justice for the vulnerable. When it comes to the reality of rights protections, much depends on the mobilization of the polity. But as the other "affair" under examination in this conference - the lynching of American Jewish businessman Leo Frank - chillingly demonstrates, popular mobilization can go either way. n78 When, in 1915, Georgia's governor commuted Frank's death sentence for murder to life without imprisonment, based on substantial concerns with the fairness of the trial and the accuracy of the verdict, a mob gathered, abducted Frank from his cell, and lynched him. n79 Popular mobilization does not always take the side of human rights, and it can easily overwhelm legal bulwarks through brute force and terror. Precisely because they help to establish and reinforce a culture of respect for equality and the rule of law, the assessments and reassessments of the "Dreyfus affair" that continue to this day in France are critically important for sustaining contemporary commitments to the rule of law. The fact that the case has become an "affair," a narrative widely known, exhaustively studied, and frequently invoked is crucial, for the history of the "affair" reminds us of what can go wrong when we depart from principles of fairness and justice. Whether the story of the United States' response to 9/11 will similarly become an "affair" from which the United States and others draw lessons about resisting the temptation to sacrifice our fundamental commitments on the backs of the most vulnerable, remains to be seen. As was the case with Dreyfus for many years, the particular lessons to be drawn from the post-9/11 era are a matter of deep contestation. President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and their supporters have sought to portray their actions as tough, but necessary and reasonable, decisions to recalibrate security and liberty. n80 Others, myself included, have insisted that the principal lesson [\*57] of the first post-9/11 decade is that sacrifices in the rule of law are all too easy to make, generally unnecessary, and come at a great cost to the legitimacy and long-term success of a democracy's struggle against terrorism. The fact that Guantanamo has become one of the world's leading symbols for "lawlessness" suggests that the latter narrative has taken hold, at least in the rest of the world. The struggle over its meaning within the United States, however, continues. n81 At stake is nothing less than the nature of our constitutional culture. Whether, after the next attack, we repeat our mistakes or respond in a more resilient and rights-respecting manner depends ultimately on the lessons we learn as a nation from our recent past. Those who are committed to the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law must continue to work to ensure that the "Guantanamo affair" takes on the character of the "Dreyfus affair" in popular consciousness. At the end of the day, the strength of our legal protections turns on our culture's engaged commitment to the values of the Constitution, the rule of law, and human rights.

Working within the government key – their alt fails

McClean 01 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU, “THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE”, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm]

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Case outweighs

Hegemony – statistics and empirics prove most peaceful, necessary create institutions and interconnectedness

Democracy – standards of rights and norms. New democracies = torture and detain based on US, plan k2 establish territorial peace spills over

### Wight

#### Analysis of social institutions key – larger structures

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A habitus (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the habitus can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the habitus and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the habitus. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

### Owen

#### No prior questions—focus on critical theory makes it impossible to describe the world and act

David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,  Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is notwholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, itis not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### 2AC Extinction 1st

#### Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing extinction outweighs structural violence—this answers their probability argument

\*\*\*people shouldn’t be valued more just because they exist close to us in time

Bostrom, 2012 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

### 2AC Guantanamo Good

#### **Litigation matters – brings public authority**

Lobel 4, Professor of Law

[December 2004, Jules Lobel is a Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, “Courts as Forums for Protest”, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 477]

[\*556] I conclude with a discussion of the litigation brought on behalf of the prisoners being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This important litigation fits comfortably within the courts as forums for protest model, and illustrates many of the insights and contradictions of the model. In early 2002, the CCR challenged the Bush Administration's detention of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo Bay without affording them the protections or rights mandated by the Geneva Convention and human rights norms. n375 At the time, many individuals and organizations were timid about openly challenging the administration's antiterrorism policies. n376 Moreover, a case on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees presented a particularly difficult context to challenge the administration. These prisoners had been captured in and around Afghanistan as part of a popular war effort. The memory of September 11 was fresh in people's minds. The government claimed that what it was doing at Guantanamo was necessary to defend American national security and prevent future terrorist attacks, a claim that resonates particularly strongly with the courts. Most important, Johnson v. Eisentrager, n377 decided by the Supreme Court in 1950, held that nonresident enemy aliens, after being convicted of war crimes by a military tribunal (detained by the U.S. government outside of U.S. territory) had no right or privilege to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of a U.S. court to challenge their detentions. While the legal and political climate was bleak, the CCR attorneys believed that Johnson was distinguishable and that it was possible to win in court. The CCR decided to take the risk. n378 The government's position was in clear violation of the Geneva Convention as well as due process and was in effect saying that no law applied to these detainees. But the CCR's objective [\*557] went beyond winning or losing in court. Its objective was to demonstrate that there was resistance to U.S. policy, to help publicize the injustice to, and plight of, the detainees, to keep the issue of the detainees in the public mind, and to use the case as part of a broader political movement against the administration's antiterrorism policies. The decision to litigate was not based on whether the CCR attorneys thought the litigation had a good chance of winning in court. The CCR first filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights of the Organization of American States, which ruled that the Guantanamo prisoners may not be held "entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States government," and that the government must accord those prisoners a hearing to determine their legal status. n379 The Bush Administration predictably refused to comply with the Commission's ruling. Indeed, given the certainty that the administration would not comply with any unfavorable Commission ruling, the purpose of the complaint was to obtain an authoritative ruling, and to use that ruling to mobilize international and domestic public opinion against the administration's Guantanamo policies. The CCR also brought a federal lawsuit on behalf of several of the detained prisoners. The federal district court, and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, ruled unanimously in the government's favor. n380 Nonetheless, the CCR persisted, and the Supreme Court decided in November 2003 to hear its appeal. n381 The Guantanamo case had an impact even before the Supreme Court handed down its June 2004 decision reversing the court of appeals. For over two years, the case helped keep the outrageous Guantanamo situation in the public eye and galvanized international protest. News reports sparked outrage at keeping the detainees in what British judges termed a "legal black hole." n382 Amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court from former federal judges, former senior American diplomats, former American POWs, former Judge Advocates General of the Navy and top Marine Corps lawyers, the Bar Association representing the fifty-four nations of the former British Commonwealth, and the International Bar Association reflected and fanned [\*558] the widespread protest against the U.S. Guantanamo policy. n383 That protest, combined with Supreme Court review, compelled the administration to release a number of the prisoners, even before the Supreme Court announced its decision. n384 The question the case presented to the Supreme Court was narrow and involved only whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay. n385 Thus, at that stage of the litigation, the specific relief being requested of the Court was minimal (although the implications of the Court grant of that relief are significant), namely, a holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' habeas petitions. On remand, the district court will determine what rights the plaintiffs have, and to what process they are entitled. Because the issue before the Court was solely jurisdictional, the plaintiffs were able to obtain a ruling articulating the basic norm that executive detentions, even in wartime, cannot be lawless. Yet because the issue was framed jurisdictionally, neither the plaintiffs nor the Court had to grapple immediately with the exact contours of the plaintiffs' rights and the potential remedies to which they may be entitled. The Supreme Court's assertion of jurisdiction to hear the case is a tremendous victory. It articulates and gives meaning to a fundamental constitutional principle: that executive detentions of prisoners outside the United States cannot operate entirely outside the law or without some legal process. While the Court's decision addresses only the applicability of the writ of habeas corpus to the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the implications of the Court's holding are broad; as Justice Scalia correctly notes in his dissent, the Court's decision potentially applies to prisoners held by the military in other places. Moreover, while the Court merely asserted federal court jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing, footnote fifteen of Justice Stevens' majority opinion states that the plaintiffs' claims "unquestionably describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" n386 That footnote, in which Justice Stevens cities Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, n387 [\*559] clearly indicates that on the merits, the plaintiffs have constitutional due process rights which a court must recognize. The Court's mere assertion of jurisdiction in the Guantanamo case has dramatically affected governmental conduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision to hear the Guantanamo case had a strong impact on the government's behavior even before the Court announced its ruling, leading to the release of many prisoners and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's decision that some process would be established to determine whether a prisoner should continue to be detained. n388 Only eight days after the Supreme Court's decision, the Department of Defense announced that procedures to inform the Guantanamo prisoners of their rights and to review their detention would be implemented. n389 The government has thus moved quickly to establish some due process for the prisoners, although the prisoners' lawyers have severely criticized that process and seek hearings before federal district courts. Therefore, the process owed plaintiffs will be back before the courts fairly quickly. Finally, the Guantanamo case also illustrates the limitations of litigation to transform the public dialogue. For some of the lawyers at the CCR, the most fundamental issue involved in the case is the Executive's use of the wartime paradigm to detain and prosecute people who should be prosecuted under civilian law. These attorneys would want to challenge whether the "war against terrorism" truly fits within the definition of a war, or whether Al Qaeda should be treated as a criminal conspiracy and its members prosecuted under ordinary civilian law. n390 But a challenge in the Guantanamo case to whether the war against Al Qaeda is really a war for constitutional or international purposes would have little chance of success in the courts. n391 Therefore, these attorneys [\*560] are relegated to making that more fundamental point in their public speaking about the case, and not in court. However, the filing and the arguing of the case at its various stages has resulted in a large amount of publicity in the United States and abroad, resulting in pressure on the government to discontinue this lawless policy. Such publicity can have various effects throughout society. It can encourage people to engage in discussion about their views on that particular situation. It can generate support for the movements advocating the various sides of the issue. It could even result in bringing new financial resources, and organizational or legal talent, to the movement. Thus, movement attorneys should realize that litigation and publicity should go together hand in hand as part of an overall strategy that will result in eventual success, even if that success is temporarily delayed by defeats in the courts. The Guantanamo litigation is but a recent example of the long tradition in this country of using courts as one arena of protest. That case started as a lonely protest against an illegal government policy. The case was originally viewed as hopeless by most legal observers and rejected by the lower courts. Many observers might even initially have said that no reasonable lawyer could have any hope for success. The publicity and international outrage surrounding the Guantanamo policy helped force the Supreme Court to take the case seriously and eventually rule for the plaintiffs. Yet the fundamental lesson of the Guantanamo case is not to be found in the important Supreme Court victory, but in the decision of a dedicated group of lawyers to litigate the case in order to protest the administration's policy despite the seemingly difficult odds of success. Conclusion The courts as forums for protest model differs from the traditional, private dispute standard on institutional reform, the two models traditionally described by legal scholars. The reduced emphasis on winning or losing and the lesser role of the judge are two features that distinguish this model from the others. Our nation has seen a long tradition of litigators and movements using the courts as platforms for arguing controversial positions and garnering public support for them. From the Revolutionary period, through this country's struggle with the issues of slavery and women's suffrage, up until modern instances where private citizens and public officials have attempted to challenge governmental actions, our system's courts have been used as forums to stir debate by the citizenry. [\*561] Because of the importance of encouraging people to engage in discussion about current social issues, and because of the implications for freedom of speech, courts should not allow sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or other similar rules to stifle popular debate stirred by lawsuits that may be considered "frivolous" because they argue against precedent or are viewed as losing cases. Bringing a lawsuit to generate publicity for one's cause should not be viewed as an improper purpose under Rule 11. Under the Courts as Forums for Protest model, judges will often find themselves in a difficult position: they will be faced with a situation where legal precedent and social and political reality collide. Though articulating a legal principle while deciding a case without enforcing that principle may seem problematic, judges should feel comfortable doing so when it is necessary in order to encourage society and governmental actors to remedy an injustice which otherwise will continue unchecked.

Even when the court gets it wrong, mobilization matters

Lobel 4, Professor of Law

[December 2004, Jules Lobel is a Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, “Courts as Forums for Protest”, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 477]

Important, recent work by social scientists raises questions about both the traditional legal model and its structural reform competitor. In the 1970s and 1980s, political and social scientists engaged in a debate parallel to the legal dispute over the legitimacy of law reform litigation. The social science discussion did not, however, focus primarily on the proper role of the courts, or the competence of the judiciary to restructure political or social institutions. Rather, social scientists debated the question of whether the judiciary's decisions really had the effect of changing society. The publication of Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope sparked the debate. Rosenberg argued that the federal courts - even in such celebrated cases as Brown v. Board of Education n36 and Roe v. Wade n37 - were largely ineffectual, [\*486] and perhaps even counterproductive, in producing social change. Rosenberg concluded that "U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform." n38 To Rosenberg "courts act as "fly paper' for social reformers who succumb to the "lure of litigation.'" n39 Rosenberg's conclusions have been challenged by a host of social scientists. Most of these academics agree with Rosenberg that judicial decisions by themselves rarely lead to social change, and that reliance on courts and judges often proves counterproductive for political and social movements. These social scientists focused, however, on the indirect effects of litigation. For scholars such as Michael McCann, Stuart Schiengold, and Joel Handler, who all studied social movements, the indirect effects and uses of litigation may be its most important aspects for social movements seeking change. n40 Social movements' use of litigation to mobilize political struggles, to gain favorable publicity, to build a political movement, to generate support for political and constitutional claims, and to provide leverage to supplement other tactics and force the opposition to settle is the central thrust of these scholars' research. Their body of work takes the position that "although the litigation by itself may not always produce immediate and sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political strategy for achieving social reform." n41 Empirical studies in such disparate areas as pay equity reform litigation, n42 disability rights cases, n43 school financial reform litigation, n44 environmental and consumer litigation, n45 and civil rights organizing n46 have demonstrated the significant indirect benefits that litigation can achieve for plaintiffs who use courts to mobilize public sentiment or to provide leverage for their claims. This social science research must be integrated into the debate among legal scholars over the proper role of the federal judiciary. A. The Courts as Forums for Protest Model The work of these social scientists requires that legal scholars conceptualize an alternative, third model of litigation not to displace, but to exist alongside the traditional dispute resolution and law reform models. If the most important effect of winning law reform cases potentially does not lie in the judicial relief awarded, but in the indirect effects of the litigation on society, than a reconceptualization of the Chayes/Fiss law reform paradigm is necessary. What I term the courts as forums for protest model would have several key characteristics that would distinguish it from both of the other two prominent paradigms. 1. Winning or Losing in Court is Not as Important as Influencing the Public Debate The lawyers' and plaintiffs' interest in the lawsuit is not solely winning or losing in court, but in getting their message out to the broader public or a particular group. The lawsuit serves as a means for the plaintiffs and their counsel to transform the court into a forum to broadcast their point of view. While the plaintiffs do have a legal claim that they believe is valid and want the court to decide, they also seek to use the litigation as a vehicle for their protest, and as a catalyst for aiding or developing a broader social movement. The efficacy of lawsuits in generating publicity has been well documented. Social scientists have observed "that litigation is one of the most effective ways to win publicity for a cause." n47 Public interest litigators and organizations have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting the media. Reflecting this recognition, it is now a common practice to announce a pending or filed public interest lawsuit at a press conference. n48 Often, litigation attracts the media's attention in a way that nothing else does. n49 Professor Joel Handler concludes that in general "a 20-page complaint and a temporary injunction are worth more than a 300 page report in the media." n50 Professor Handler discusses a category of litigation he studied where the tactic that distinguishes these cases is that the law reformers do not expect to achieve results through a court or administrative order; such proceedings will take too long or become too costly ... . Rather, they [\*488] use legal proceedings to generate harmful publicity that will force the discriminator into a settlement. n51 The educational value of litigation is often substantial even where the case does not result in a legal victory. Professor Michael McCann demonstrates that pay equity advocates used lawsuits as "a crucial organizing tool," and that for many of the activists "whether you win or lose [in court], awareness rises through this type of action." n52 For Professor McCann, while the pay equity litigation resulted in only modest policy reforms, "perhaps the single most important achievement of the movement has been the transformations in many working women's understandings, commitments, and affiliations." n53 Similarly, Professor Richard Gambitta studied the impact of the school finance case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, n54 which challenged the constitutionality of financing education by means of local property taxes on the ground that it produced substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures between rich and poor school districts. n55 Although the plaintiffs lost in the Supreme Court, n56 Gambitta concluded that the litigation nevertheless influenced the legislative agenda. Thus, even ultimately defeated litigation "can recast the nature of a debate," and "facilitate debates that otherwise may not occur, thus setting in motion, at times, the process of policy change." n57 This social science research is buttressed by the experience of the bar. For example, William Colby, the Cruzan family's attorney in their famous "right-to-die case" n58 that lost in the Supreme Court, explained: The public discourse surrounding the cases quickly took on a life of its own. The true legacy of the two cases is that they caused [the country] to talk about death, dying, living wills, hospital ethics committees, and the withdrawal of futile medical treatment and who should make that decision. This nationwide discussion very quickly [\*489] outgrew the individual lawsuits of two young girls involved in car accidents. n59 Similarly, Yale Professor Harold Koh's experience in transnational public law litigation led him to view such litigation "as a development whose success should be measured not by favorable judgments, but by practical results: the norms declared, the political pressure generated, the government practices abated, and the lives saved." n60 For Professor Koh, even "adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops, but only way stations, in the process of "complex enforcement.'" n61 The recent litigation involving the suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners indefinitely detained by the Bush Administration at the U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay without any legal process is but another example. The lower courts uniformly rejected the prisoners' petitions for habeas corpus relief. Nonetheless, the litigation received a significant amount of press attention and helped keep the issue in the public eye for almost two years. That public pressure undoubtedly contributed to the Supreme Court's decision to hear the case, and eventually reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

### 2AC Drone DA

#### Drone strikes are inevitable—any wind-downs are only rhetoric

Mazzetti and Landler 8/2

[08/02/13, Mark Mazzetti and Mark Landler, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0]

WASHINGTON — There were more drone strikes in Pakistan last month than any month since January. Three missile strikes were carried out in Yemen in the last week alone. And after Secretary of State John Kerry told Pakistanis on Thursday that the United States was winding down the drone wars there, officials back in Washington quickly contradicted him. More than two months after President Obama signaled a sharp shift in America’s targeted-killing operations, there is little public evidence of change in a strategy that has come to define the administration’s approach to combating terrorism. Most elements of the drone program remain in place, including a base in the southern desert of Saudi Arabia that the Central Intelligence Agency continues to use to carry out drone strikes in Yemen. In late May, administration officials said that the bulk of drone operations would shift to the Pentagon from the C.I.A. But the C.I.A. continues to run America’s secret air war in Pakistan, where Mr. Kerry’s comments underscored the administration’s haphazard approach to discussing these issues publicly. During a television interview in Pakistan on Thursday, Mr. Kerry said the United States had a “timeline” to end drone strikes in that country’s western mountains, adding, “We hope it’s going to be very, very soon.” But the Obama administration is expected to carry out drone strikes in Pakistan well into the future. Hours after Mr. Kerry’s interview, the State Department issued a statement saying there was no definite timetable to end the targeted killing program in Pakistan, and a department spokeswoman, Marie Harf, said, “In no way would we ever deprive ourselves of a tool to fight a threat if it arises.” Micah Zenko, a fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, who closely follows American drone operations, said Mr. Kerry seemed to have been out of sync with the rest of the Obama administration in talking about the drone program. “There’s nothing that indicates this administration is going to unilaterally end drone strikes in Pakistan,” Mr. Zenko said, “or Yemen for that matter.”

#### The aff only maintains the effectiveness of Boumediene—that doesn’t result in targeted killings

Vladeck 12 [10/01/12, Professor Stephen I. Vladeck of the Washington College of Law at American University, “Detention Policies: What Role for Judicial Review?”, <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/detention_policies_what_role_for_judicial_review/>)]

The short chapter that follows aims to take Judge Brown’s suggestion seriously. As I explain, although Judge Brown is clearly correct that judicial review has affected the size of the detainee populations within the territorial United States and at Guantanamo, it does not even remotely follow that the jurisprudence of the past decade has precipitated a shift away from detention and toward targeted killings. To the contrary, the jurisprudence of Judge Brown’s own court has simultaneously (1) left the government with far greater detention authority than might otherwise be apparent where noncitizens outside the United States are concerned; and (2) for better or worse, added a semblance of legitimacy to a regime that had previously and repeatedly been decried as lawless. And in cases where judicial review prompted the government to release those against whom it had insufficient evidence, the effects of such review can only be seen as salutary. Thus, at the end of a decade where not a single U.S. military detainee was freed by order of a federal judge, it is more than a little ironic for Judge Brown to identify “take no prisoners” as Boumediene’s true legacy.

#### No tradeoff

Robert **Chesney 11**, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the UT School of Law as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, "Examining the Evidence of a Detention-Drone Strike Tradeoff", October 17, www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/examining-the-evidence-of-a-detention-drone-strike-tradeoff/

Yesterday Jack linked to this piece by Noah Feldman, which among other things advances the argument that the Obama administration has resorted to drone strikes at least in part in order to avoid having to grapple with the legal and political problems associated with military detention:¶ Guantanamo is still open, in part because Congress put obstacles in the way. Instead of detaining new terror suspects there, however, Obama vastly expanded the tactic of targeting them, with eight times more drone strikes in his first year than in all of Bush’s time in office.¶ Is there truly a detention-drone strike tradeoff, such that the Obama administration favors killing rather than capturing? As an initial matter, the numbers quoted above aren’t correct according to the New America Foundation database of drone strikes in Pakistan, 2008 saw a total of 33 strikes, while in 2009 there were 53 (51 subsequent to President Obama’s inauguration). Of course, you can recapture something close to the same point conveyed in the quote by looking instead to the full number of strikes conducted under Bush and Obama, respectively. There were relatively few drone strikes prior to 2008, after all, while the numbers jump to 118 for 2010 and at least 60 this year (plus an emerging Yemen drone strike campaign). But what does all this really prove?¶ Not much, I think. Most if not all of the difference in drone strike rates can be accounted for by specific policy decisions relating to the quantity of drones available for these missions, the locations in Pakistan where drones have been permitted to operate, and most notably whether drone strikes were conditioned on obtaining Pakistani permission. Here is how I summarize the matter in my forthcoming article on the legal consequences of the convergence of military and intelligence activities:¶ According to an analysis published by the New America Foundation, two more drone strikes in Pakistan’s FATA region followed in 2005, with at least two more in 2006, four more in 2007, and four more in the first half of 2008.[1] The pattern was halting at best. Yet that soon changed. U.S. policy up to that point had been to obtain Pakistan’s consent for strikes,[2] and toward that end to provide the Pakistani government with advance notification of them.[3] But intelligence suggested that on some occasions “the Pakistanis would delay planned strikes in order to warn al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, whose fighters would then disperse.”[4] A former official explained that in this environment, it was rare to get permission and not have the target slip away: “If you had to ask for permission, you got one of three answers: either ‘No,’ or ‘We’re thinking about it,’ or ‘Oops, where did the target go?”[5]¶ Declaring that he’d “had enough,” Bush in the summer of 2008 “ordered stepped-up Predator drone strikes on al Qaeda leaders and specific camps,” and specified that Pakistani officials going forward should receive only “‘concurrent notification’…meaning they learned of a strike as it was underway or, just to be sure, a few minutes after.”[6] Pakistani permission no longer was required.[7] ¶ The results were dramatic. The CIA conducted dozens of strikes in Pakistan over the remainder of 2008, vastly exceeding the number of strikes over the prior four years combined.[8] That pace continued in 2009, which eventually saw a total of 53 strikes.[9] And then, in 2010, the rate more than doubled, with 188 attacks (followed by 56 more as of late August 2011).[10] The further acceleration in 2010 appears to stem at least in part from a meeting in October 2009 during which President Obama granted a CIA request both for more drones and for permission to extend drone operations into areas of Pakistan’s FATA that previously had been off limits or at least discouraged.[11] ¶ There is an additional reason to doubt that the number of drone strikes tells us much about a potential detention/targeting tradeoff: most of these strikes involved circumstances in which there was no feasible option for capturing the target. These strikes are concentrated in the FATA region, after all. ¶ Having said all that: it does not follow that there is no detention-targeting tradeoff at work. I’m just saying that drone strikes in the FATA typically should not be understood in that way (though there might be limited exceptions where a capture raid could have been feasible). Where else to look, then, for evidence of a detention/targeting tradeoff?¶ Bear in mind that it is not as if we can simply assume that the same number of targets emerge in the same locations and circumstances each year, enabling an apples-to-apples comparison. But set that aside.¶ First, consider locations that (i) are outside Afghanistan (since we obviously still do conduct detention ops for new captures there) and (ii) entail host-state government control over the relevant territory plus a willingness either to enable us to conduct our own ops on their territory or to simply effectuate captures themselves and then turn the person(s) over to us. This is how most GTMO detainees captured outside Afghanistan ended up at GTMO. Think Bosnia with respect to the Boumediene petitioners, Pakistan’s non-FATA regions, and a variety of African and Asian states where such conditions obtained in years past. In such locations, we seem to be using neither drones nor detention. Rather, we either are relying on host-state intervention or we are limiting ourselves to surveillance. Very hard to know how much of each might be going on, of course. If it is occurring often, moreover, it might reflect a decline in host-state willingness to cooperate with us (in light of increased domestic and diplomatic pressure from being seen to be responsible for funneling someone into our hands, and the backdrop understanding that, in the age of wikileaks, we simply can’t promise credibly that such cooperation will be kept secret). In any event, this tradeoff is not about detention versus targeting, but something much more complex and difficult to measure.

#### Drone arms race inevitable

USA Today 13

(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, “Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race”)

The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a global arms race, raising concerns the remotely piloted aircraft could fall into unfriendly hands, military experts say. The number of countries that have acquired or developed drones expanded to more than 75, up from about 40 in 2005, according to the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress. Iran and China are among the countries that have fielded their own systems. "People have seen the successes we've had," said Lt. Gen. Larry James, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The U.S. military has used drones extensively in Afghanistan, primarily to watch over enemy targets. Armed drones have been used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

### Executive Circumvention 2AC

#### No circumvention –

#### a) strategy

Stimson 9

[09/25/09, Cully Stimson is a senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation and an instructor at the Naval Justice School former American career appointee at the Pentagon. Stimson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, “Punting National Security To The Judiciary”, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/09/25/punting-national-security-to-the-judiciary/]

So what is really going on here? To those of us who have either served in senior policy posts and dealt with these issues on a daily basis, or followed them closely from the outside, it is becoming increasingly clear that this administration is trying to create the appearance of a tough national-security policy regarding the detention of terrorists at Guantanamo, yet allow the courts to make the tough calls on releasing the bad guys. Letting the courts do the dirty work would give the administration plausible cover and distance from the decision-making process. The numbers speak for themselves. Of the 38 detainees whose cases have been adjudicated through the habeas process in federal court in Washington, 30 have been ordered released by civilian judges. That is close to an 80 percent loss rate for the government, which argued for continued detention. Yet, how many of these decisions has this administration appealed, knowing full well that many of those 30 detainees should not in good conscience be let go? The answer: one. Letting the courts do it for him gives the president distance from the unsavory release decisions. It also allows him to state with a straight face, as he did at the Archives speech, “We are not going to release anyone if it would endanger our national security, nor will we release detainees within the United States who endanger the American people.” No, the president won’t release detainees; he’ll sit back and let the courts to do it for him. And the president won’t seek congressional authorization for prolonged detention of the enemy, as he promised, because it will anger his political base on the Left. The ultra-liberals aren’t about to relinquish their “try them or set them free” mantra, even though such a policy threatens to put terrorists back on the battlefield. Moreover, the president would have to spend political capital to win congressional authorization for a prolonged detention policy. Obviously, he would rather spend that capital on other policy priorities. Politically speaking, it is easier to maintain the status quo and let the detainees seek release from federal judges. The passive approach also helps the administration close Gitmo without taking the heat for actually releasing detainees themselves.

#### b) informal mechanisms

Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And

Legal Constraint” Duke Law Scholarship Repository) http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5451&context=faculty\_scholarship

One of the grounds of skepticism about whether the presidency is constrained by law concerns the frequent lack of formal enforcement mechanisms. There is an extensive jurisprudential literature on whether and to what extent enforcement is necessary in order for norms to qualify as law.105 Modern perspectives on law, in the tradition of H.L.A. Hart, tend to de-emphasize the importance of external enforcement and focus instead on internal perceptions, a point we return to in Part III. For present purposes, we simply note two things. First, a norm need not be perfectly enforced in order to constrain. Of course, as the legal realists emphasized, one cannot get an accurate picture of the law by looking only at the law on the books rather than the law in action.106 Our point here, however, is simply that the lack of perfect enforcement of a legal rule does not mean the rule does not exist, or that it does not constrain. The fact that homicides continue to be committed in the United States—and that not everyone who commits such a crime is apprehended and prosecuted—does not remove or render meaningless the legal prohibition against homicide. Second, enforcement need not be formal. Domestic criminal laws, of course, are typically implemented through a range of formal enforcement mechanisms, such as state-sanctioned incarceration. Even such formal modes of enforcement, however, are probably enhanced by informal mechanisms such as public shaming and exclusion. For example, the formal punishment-based deterrence against committing an offense like embezzlement is likely enhanced by a desire to avoid public embarrassment and a worry about the difficulty of obtaining future employment.107 Even when the likely enforcement mechanisms are entirely informal, we think they should count for purposes of evaluating whether law operates as a constraint. For some issues of presidential power, there are very few potential modes of formal enforcement (impeachment may be the only formal mode), and the likelihood that they would be employed to sanction any particular presidential act is generally very low. But there may still be enforcement through informal mechanisms such as congressional backlash and public disapproval. If those enforcement measures are triggered or intensified at least in part by the legal status of a norm, then we believe one can meaningfully describe them as a type of legal enforcement. On this point it is worth noting that, outside of the area of constitutional law, it is generally accepted that law can act as a constraint even when it takes the form of customary norms, and even when it is subject primarily to informal enforcement. There is a rich literature, for example, on the customary “law merchant” in medieval Europe, the enforcement of which was based heavily on reputation.108 Gillian Hadfield and Barry Weingast have recently supplemented that literature with modeling that shows how legal norms in general can be effective even in the absence of centralized enforcement.109 As applied to presidential power, this analysis suggests, once again, that the interrelationship of law and politics does not by itself negate the importance of law.

#### c) fidelity to law

Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , “Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And

Legal Constraint” Duke Law Scholarship Repository) http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5451&context=faculty\_scholarship

Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also takes for granted a phenomenon that merits attention—that Presidents follow judicial decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the United States today. To take one relatively recent example, despite disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on terror, the Bush Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why Presidents abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue of the constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with judicial decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is true, as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential behavior is motivated by concerns about external political perceptions rather than an internal sense of fidelity to law (or judicial review).120

#### d) fear of censure

Saikrishna Prakash 12**,** professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, “The Goldilocks Executive” Feb, SSRN

We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, that they find the President’s policy preferences legal more often than they do not, and that the President sometimes disregards their conclusions. But the close attention the Executive pays to legal constraints suggests that the President (who, after all, is in a good position to know) believes himself constrained by law. Perhaps Posner and Vermeule believe that the President is mistaken. But we think, to the contrary, it represents the President’s recognition of the various constraints we have listed, and his appreciation that attempting to operate outside the bounds of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public

### AT Alt Discuses Guantanamo

#### The plan’s discussion is critical—Individual methods fail—participating in organizations checks impulses to care about short-term personal issues

Cole 2011 - Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Winter, David, “WHERE LIBERTY LIES: CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AFTER 9/11,” 57 Wayne L. Rev. 1203, Lexis)

But the engagement that "civil society constitutionalism" identifies as essential has a more particular focus, on constitutionalism itself. Groups like the ACLU, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the Bill of Rights Defense Committee are defined by their commitment to such rights. But they are only the most obvious opportunities for engagement. Civil society offers a broad range of ways in which individuals may become involved in constitutional discourse--by attending lectures or demonstrations; participating in ad hoc groups focused on issues of rights; writing letters to the editor, blogs, or op-eds; teaching one's children; or debating with one's neighbors. There are an almost infinite variety of ways to engage with constitutionalism. But organized collective endeavors, with existing rights groups or through the creation of new ones, are probably the most effective. Joining a group defined by its commitment to constitutional and human rights is itself a check on one's own temptations to short-circuit rights, or to waver in one's attention or commitment to rights. The collective not only magnifies the impact that an individual might have, but also helps to hold individuals to their commitments. Thus, "civil society constitutionalism" is not just a direction for scholarship, or a justification for constitutional doctrine, but a pragmatic directive to citizens: get involved in the defense of your Constitution, or you may find it wanting when it is needed most.

### Alt Fails

#### Making truth claims is inevitable – the alternative is a bankrupt strategy that stagnates politics

Houghton, Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, ‘8 (David, “Positivism 'vs' Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference?” International Politics, Vol 45, p 115-128)

Discussions of the role of subjectivity by postmodernists in our understanding of the world do not significantly advance us beyond a point we have already reached. To return to the threefold definition of positivism given at the outset, postmodernist research makes anti-objectivist, anti-naturalist and anti-empiricist claims, but cannot avoid using empirical evidence to illustrate explanatory truth claims — and hence being explanatory in nature. Empiricism is the central and most important feature of positivism; indeed, the two terms are so closely related that they are often used interchangeably. While postmodernist research in IR has been post-positivist in aspiration — disputing objectivism, empiricism and naturalism as principles — in practice it has not managed to escape the empirical focus of mainstream, positivist IR. In this sense, one might doubt whether there exists such a thing as a genuinely 'postpositivist' argument. There is a growing recognition of this in mainstream IR. Responding to Roxanne Doty's critique of his book Social Theory of International Politics, Alexander Wendt makes the following comments: "Having been a classmate of hers in graduate school I am not surprised that Roxanne Doty believes her cats exist ... To my knowledge not even the most hardened postmodernists have explicitly denied that objects of everyday existence exist. Given this agreement on at least a 'commonsense realism', however, it is instructive to consider how Doty knows her cats exist (Wendt, 2000, 172)." Wendt speculates that Doty knows this because she believes the evidence of her own eyes and her own experience: 'this reasoning reproduces, in a lay science context, exactly what a positivist would say about professional science: she has used empirical observations and instrumental success to test the correspondence, the truth, of her theory of cats against the world' (Wendt, 2000, 173). Although most mainstream IR scholars would if pushed describe themselves as positivist or at least empiricist, conventional IR theory has long been content to live with a variety of vague and abstract concepts that cannot be directly observed or measured, such as 'the state', the 'international system', 'international structures', 'interdependence', 'globalization', the 'balance of power', the 'national interest' and so on. As Michael Nicholson suggests, IR theory has always been characterized by a kind of relaxed and non-dogmatic version of positivism, since there was never any real alternative to this (Nicholson, 1996). It remains for postmodernists to clearly articulate what a genuinely postpositivist epistemology would or should look like. As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of IR would ever be possible (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1988). The popularity of the 'naïve' form of positivism, wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and supposedly practiced by wide-eyed scholars during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past. Postmod

ernists hence do the discipline a disservice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it still represented a dominant orthodoxy, which must somehow be overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or 'neo-' version of positivism perform a similar disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for, neo-positivists have allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of straw men who burn rapidly at the slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but contemporary neo-positivists are, I would suggest, committed to the following five assumptions, none of which are especially radical or hard to defend: (1) That explaining the social and political world ought to be our central objective, (2) That — subjective though our perceptions of the world may be — many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable. What remains is a conviction that there are at least some empirical propositions, which can be demonstrably shown to be 'true' or 'false', some underlying regularities that clearly give shape to IR (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another), (3) That careful use of appropriate methodological techniques can establish what patterns exist in the political world, (4) That positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, although both constitute valid and interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term 'positivism' as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to cover them. But to the extent that there exists an 'orthodoxy' in the field of IR today, this is surely it.

## 1AR

#### Debating about the aff is key – our discussion maintains the social injustices of Guantanamo in the public consciousness – that’s key to organize effective strategies for pragmatic change of those structures – the alt can’t resolve this because they don’t access institutional deliberation.

#### Judicial action is a meaningful restraint, and debating judicial restraints on prez powers is good

Serrano and Minami, ‘03 (Susan, Project Director, Equal Justice Society; J.D. 1998, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai', partner, Minami, Lew & Timaki, Asian Law Journal, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, p. Lexis)

Today, a broadly conceived political identity is critical to the defense of civil liberties. In 1942, Japanese Americans stood virtually alone, without allies, and suffered the banishment of their entire race. Forty years later, Japanese Americans, supported by Americans of all colors, were able to extract an apology and redress from a powerful nation. That lesson of the need for political empowerment was made even more obvious after September 11, 2001, when Arab and Muslim American communities, politically isolated and besieged by hostility fueled by ignorance, became targets of violence and discrimination. In the aftermath of September 11, Japanese Americans knew from history that the United States, which turned on them in 1942, could repeat itself in 2001. Therefore, on September 12, 2001, the Japanese American Citizens' League, the oldest Asian American civil rights organization in the country, immediately issued a press release warning against racial discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and supporting their  [[\*49]](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)  civil rights.n60 Other Japanese American individuals and groups have offered their friendship, political support, and solidarity with Arab and Muslim Americans. Japanese Americans also knew from their Redress experience that political power was the strongest antidote. The coram nobis legal teams understood the political dimensions of their cases and adopted a course of litigation that would discredit the Wartime Cases by undermining the legal argument that the Supreme Court had legitimized the World War II exclusion and detention. This impaired (though did not overturn) the value of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui as legal precedents for mass imprisonments of any definable racial group without due process. The even larger vision of these cases, however, was the long-term education of the American public. Many still believed (and continue to believe) that there were valid reasons for incarcerating Japanese Americans en masse: the coram nobis cases strongly refuted that notion and boldly illuminated the essentially political nature of the judicial system. In doing so, the coram nobis cases have contributed to the public's education about the frailty of civil rights and the evanescence of justice in our courts. As such, these cases highlight the need for continuing political activism and constant vigilance to protect our civil rights. In today's climate of fear and uncertainty, we must engage ourselves to assure that the vast national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of vulnerable groups.

This means exercising our political power, making our dissents heard, publicizing injustices done to our communities as well as to others, and enlisting allies from diverse communities. Concretely, this may mean joining others' struggles in the courts, Congress, schools and union halls; organizing protests against secret arrests, incarcerations, and deportations; building coalitions with other racial communities; writing op-ed essays or letters to politicians; launching media campaigns; donating money; and writing essays and articles.n61 Through these various ways, "our task is to compel our institutions, particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to "protect all.'" n62 The lesson of the Wartime Cases and coram nobis cases taken together is not that the government may target an entire ethnic group in the name of national security; the cases teach us instead that civil rights and liberties are best protected by strongly affirming their place in our national character, especially in times of national crisis. As Fred Korematsu avowed nearly twenty years ago, we must not let our governmental  [[\*50]](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)  institutions mistreat another racial group in such a manner again. To do this, we must "collectively [turn] the lessons learned, the political and economic capital gained, the alliances forged and the spirit renewed, into many small and some grand advances against continuing harmful discrimination across America."n63 We must become, as Professor Yamamoto has argued, "present-day social actors, agents of justice, because real, hard injustices are occurring all around us every day to Asian Americans and other racial communities and beyond." n64

Aff solves bare life

Ahmad 9, Professor of Law

[2009, Muneer I. Ahmad is a Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, “RESISTING GUANTÁNAMO: RIGHTS AT THE BRINK OF DEHUMANIZATION”, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 1683, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 08-65] we do not endorse gendered language

Rights as Resistance.—Habeas corpus, whose history has been explored exhaustively by others,297 translates as ―show me the body,‖ and captures the communitarian, corporeal, and testimonial dimensions of not just rights claims, but citizenship. For a judge to order the government to produce a defendant for the purposes of considering the legality of his detention is to recognize the defendant‘s a priori membership in the community. To require that the defendant himself—his corpus—be produced, and not just reasons for his detention proffered, is to acknowledge the physicality and inescapably human experience of an otherwise abstract liberty interest. And to permit the defendant to not only attend his own hearing, but to speak on his own behalf, is to credit his standing as an actor and agent. Taken together, the communitarian, corporeal, and testimonial bespeak a shared concern: human dignity. It is this human dignity, the human as distinguished from the merely biological, with which Arendt was fundamentally concerned. For Arendt, rights are indispensable to humanity, a protective membrane poised between the state and the individual. What she saw, and Giorgio Agamben has recently revived,298 is the idea that a confrontation between the state and the individual unmediated by rights reduces the individual to bare life, or naked life,299 which is life without humanity. It is this unmediated, unmitigated confrontation that both requires and enables the rendering of the human inhuman, animal, and savage.300 It is this rights-free confrontation that permits torture—the hand of the state encumbered by no law other than the laws of physics. And it is this unmediated confrontation that permits the transmogrification of a child into a terrorist. For Arendt, to be a citizen is to be human, and to be anything else is merely, and barely, life. The conception of rights as a bare protection interposed between the individual and state violence is intuitively familiar to the anti-death penalty advocate301 and to criminal defense lawyers generally. But the American legal embodiment of citizenship as rights is Dred Scott.302 While Scott was suing for his freedom from slavery, the case turned upon his citizenship. The Supreme Court found that Scott was not a ―citizen of a State,‖ and therefore, under the jurisdictional limits of Article III of the Constitution, could not bring suit in federal court.303 Thus, the case removed Scott‘s right even to be heard, by removing him from the polity. Like the Guantánamo prisoners, he had no right to have rights, and the negation of his political citizenship condemned him to the unmitigated violence of slavery. The denial of habeas to Omar and the other prisoners similarly placed them outside the communitarian consent that rights require.

This expulsion from the polity authorizes the expulsion from humanity that torture represents. Here, we must remember that this expulsion was prefigured by the state iconography that placed the prisoners outside the realm of human understanding, and therefore outside of humanity itself.304 Stripped of the mediation of rights, Guantánamo reveals the essential and inescapable violence of law. Politics may dictate who is entitled to mediation and what form it will take, but all are subject to the force of the state that, fundamentally, animates law. The demand for rights is a plea to blunt state force, and not to fundamentally reorganize the structure of power. With this understanding of rights in mind, I return to the litigation strategy we adopted in Omar‘s case. By invoking rights, we sought recognition of Omar in a polity of significance. In this way, rights hailed Omar into the community, though his admission would depend upon community consent. As Arendt‘s analysis suggests, the demand for recognition is tantamount to a claim to humanity. To be human, to rise above biological existence and to secure political and social life, requires rights. And yet, once more, this bid was subject to political forces. No amount of rights-claiming could overcome a political will to deny the prisoners‘ humanity. In light of this, our strategy can be understood in a third way: rights as resistance. By this account, the rights claim sought not to escape the violence of the state, but to make that violence more costly to the state. To continue its brutal regime at Guantánamo, the government first would have to do violence to rights; to lay its hands on Omar again, the state would have to crash through his rights claims. Rather than avoid the state‘s confrontation with the individual, this strategy seeks to expose it. The onus then shifts from the prisoner trying to establish the existence of rights to the state establishing their nonexistence, from the individual establishing harm done to the state justifying its own violence. In some respects, this strategy has worked. So long as it could avoid any discussion of Guantánamo, as it long attempted to do, the government could enact violence without political cost. But rights claims force the government into discourse in which the violence of the state is put on display and must be justified. The claim of rights itself may interpose a membrane between the state and the individual even if the right itself ultimately is found not to exist. Thus, our rights-based strategy could be understood as interposing a protective membrane between Omar and the state. In this way, we wanted to mediate, and moderate, the relationship between the state and Omar, with the hope of ultimately transforming the relationship from one of potentate and biological mass to one more recognizable as warden and prisoner. This was a form of resistance to Omar‘s mistreatment, which required the state either to stop its violence or to engage in it in the public forum of the court. This approach had some success, as the worst of the mistreatment of Omar and the other prisoners stopped once the government was forced to grapple with it in the daylight of federal court.305 And yet, Omar‘s other fundamental material conditions—indefinite detention, and trial before a substandard tribunal—remained the same, just as the fundamentals of Guantánamo have remained largely the same for the hundreds of other prisoners. At the end of the day, I believe our approach has not proven more successful because the fundamental question of political citizenship has not been resolved in the prisoners‘ favor, and as I have argued, the success of even first-order rights depends upon a priori political membership. When I have rehearsed these arguments for others, particularly lawyers, the response I have often gotten is that we did the best that we could, and that there was no alternative. To argue the existence of rights, and to do so forcefully, is to fulfill the professional obligation of a lawyer. But this strikes me as too weak a conception of professional obligation. I believe that the rights-based approach has been worthy and necessary, but not merely because it was a form of last-resort lawyering. Rather, the rightsbased lawyering has performed an essential role of mounting resistance to the unbridled exercise of state violence, essential not because there is nothing else to be done, but because of the opportunities and potentialities that resistance creates. This is consistent with what Scott Cummings has termed ―constrained legalism,‖ 306 for it capitalizes on what law can accomplish, even as it recognizes what law cannot.